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I. INTRODUCION
The Soviet criminal justice system was barbaric. Citizens suffered degradation,
humiliation, deprivation, and outright torture.' The government, in the name of
national security, limited the movement of citizens and monitored their activities 2
Government agencies and officials identified criminals based not only on actions but
also on party quotas Once identified, criminals were arrested, interrogated, and
sentenced with little or no opportunity to put on a defense.! This Comment considers
and critiques the efforts to reform the criminal justice system of post-Soviet Russia
and considers prospects for future development of the rule of law.
1. See generally FRED COLEMAN, THEDECLNEAND FALL OFTHE SOVIET EMPIRE: FoRTY YEARS TIAT
SHOOKThE WORLD, FROM STALIN ToY ssN (1996) (recounting the harassment and torture suffered by Russian
citizens during the Soviet regime). "In mid-August 1937 torture was sanctioned as a normal procedure of
interrogation in Soviet prisons:' RosrRT SERVICE, A HISTORY OF TwENT -CENTuRY RussIA 221 (1998). Cf.
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM OF TiE USSR (M. Cherif Bassiouni & V.M. Savitski eds., 1979), [for Soviet
perspective on the organization and function of the criminal justice system hereinafter Bassiouni & Savitski].
Families of an "enemy of thepeople" also faced deportation. See DAVID REmNiCK, LENIN'STOMB: LASTDAYS OF
THESovIErEMPIRE 23 (1994). The phrase "Soviet Justice' evoked "linmages of Joseph Stalin and of show trials;
of bribery, graft, and corruption; of the rule of caprice over law" in many people. "Mime had stripped away the
dignity of the words .... The terror had passed, yes. But the taint remained. The police were feared, the courts
disparaged; the organs of law and order were the enemy." ROBERT RAND, COMRADE LAwYER: INSIDE Sovwm"
Ju-cE IN AN ERA OF REFORM (1991).
2. See infra notes 53-57 and accompanying text (examining the power of the Committee of State Security
(KGB) under Gorbachev). See also COLEMAN, supra note 1, at 103 (describing the sophistication of KGB listening
devices andcitizens attempts to maintain theirprivacy). "State Security was so pervasive that no one could organize
even the smallest protest demonstration without the KGB knowing in advance and positioned to bust it up in the
opening moments." Id.
3. See COLEMAN, supra note 1, at 164-73 (criticizing the KGB and considering the history of the secret
police in Imperial Russia and the Union of Soviet Socialists Republics (USSR)).
When Lavrenty Beria ran Stalin's secret police, he liked to refer to anyone hauled in for questioning as
"the accused." One hapless victim actually worked up the courage to object. 'Tm not the accused," he
complained to Beria. "here has been no indictment. I'm only the suspect" With exaggerated patience,
Beria escorted the poor creature over to the window of hi s office atop Lubyanka prison and pointed nine
floors below to the ordinary citizens of Moscow walking around Dzerzhinsky Square outside. "Down
there are the suspects," Beria explained. "Up here, you are the accuseL"
Id. at 164 (emphasis added).
4. See id. at 105-07 (relating the arrests, detention, and trials of three dissidents). On January 4,1977, the
police conducted an eleven-hour search of Yuri Orlov's home. See id. Before the search was even complete the
Soviet government's news agency reported that evidencehadbeen found tying Orlov and otherdissidents loan anti-
Soviet organization. Seeid. Despite the factthat the search uncovered no such evidence, Orlov and two others were
quickly arrested. See id. They were held for investigation for more than a year then "sentenced In closed trials on
absurd charges." See Id. at 105-06; see also SERVICE, supra note 1, at 210-35 (discussing the years of terror under
Stalin).
[Stalin's] method was systematically arbitrary; for the Politburo decision of 31 July 1937 assigned
arrest-quotas to each major territorial unit of the USSR.... [It was laid down that 72,950 of
victims--twenty-eight percent-should be shot and the restgiven 'eight to ten' years in prison orlabour
camp.
Id. at 221-22. But see Bassiouni & Savitski, supra note 1, at 67 (describing the rights of a criminal suspect under
Soviet law).
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In the 1980s, under the guidance of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev,5 the
government instituted a series of reforms, called perestroika, in an attempt to address
the socio-economic problems plaguing the union.6 In the final years of their control,
Soviet leaders incorporated reforms to the criminal justice system into perestroika.7
However, reform efforts failed to solve the economic and social problems of the
country, and the USSR collapsed in 1991.
Throughout the 1990s, the government of the Russian Federation continued the
reform efforts of the late Soviet period.9 These measures significantly affected the
process available to citizens subjected to the criminal justice system"0 Ongoing
reform efforts instituted changes in pre-trial investigation, detention, and trial
procedures.11 However, the question remains whether enough was done to end the
reign of terror and develop a rule of law.
This Comment focuses on the post-Soviet reforms designed to end terror and
prioritize the rule of law within the Russian criminal justice systemn 2 To lay the
groundwork for this material, Part II evaluates the Soviet criminal justice system as
a foundation for reform. 3 Part II then considers two specific areas of the Soviet
system that contributed to the reign of terror: (1) the power of the national security
5. Gorbachevwas GeneralSecrtary from 1985-1991.See COLEMAN, supra note 1, atix. Seegenerallyid
at 217-361 (following Gorbachev's rise to power and his fall as the USSR collapsed).
6. See. eg., SERVICE, supra note 1, at 448-66 (evaluating the effects of perestroika). "[Pjerestoika had
primarily been conceived as a fundamental restructuring of the economic system."Friedrich-Christian Schroeder,
Perestroika and Development in Soviet Criminal Law, in THE EMANCIPAON OF SOVIET LAW 185, 187 (E.M.
Feldbrugge ed., 1992).
7. See Schroeder, supra note 6, at 187-91 (discussing the incorporation of criminal law into perestroika);
see also Martin Fimcke, Rebuilding Soviet Criminal Procedure, in TRE EMANcipAIoN OF SovIT LAw 199, 204
(FJM.Feldbrugge ed., 1992) (describing the transition to rule of law as the goal ofGorbachev'sreforms); see also
Infra notes 76-94 and accompanying text (discussing perestroika and specific reforms affecting the criminaljustice
system).
8. On December8, 1991, following months ofdebate over Gorbachev's proposal foranew Union Treaty,
the USSR officially dissolved. See RUssA AND THE INDEPENDENT STATES 38691 (Daniel C. Diller ed., 1993)
(chronicling significant events of 1991); see also COLEMAN, supra note 1, at 325-57 (considering political events
leading up to the coup of 1991 and the collapse of the USSR); see also FJ.M. FELDBtuGGE, RusSIAN LAW: THE
ENDOFTHESOViErSYSTEMANDTH-ROLEoFLAw 132-38 (1993) (examining the transition fromthe USSR to the
Commonwealth of Independent States).
9. See infra notes 103-264 and accompanying text (discussing post-Soviet reforms).
10. See, e.g.,Tarnaa G. Morshchakova, The Chechen War Case and Other Recent Jurisprudence of the
Russian Constitutional Court, 42 ST. LouIs U. LJ. 743, 746-50 (1998) (discussing individual rights of Russian
citizens); see also Todd Foglesong, Habeas Corpus or Who Has the Body? Judicial Review ofArrest and Pretrial
Detention in Russia, 14 WIs. INT'L L.L 541 (1996) (discussing implementation of the 1992 law that gave the
judiciary power to review legality of arrest and pretrial detention); see also infra notes 95-206 and accompanying
text (discussing the Russian criminaljustice system).
11. See infra notes 209-61 and accompanying text (evaluating various roles to be played in criminal
proceedings).
12. See infra notes 103-261 and accompanying text (presenting an overview of the structum and function
ofthe criminajustice system).
13. See infra notes 25-94 and accompanying text (evaluating the Soviet criminal justice system).
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forces, 14 and (2) the treatment of "criminals" in the Soviet prison and corrective
labor systems.15 Finally, this section reviews Soviet reforms during the period of
perestroika. 16
Part I first considers the role of the Soviet Constitution, Code of Criminal
Procedure, and Criminal Code in the transition to the rule of law."7 This section also
evaluates the dissolution of the KGB and the diffusion of the KGB's responsibilities
to Russian security agencies.' 8 Part III concludes by examining reforms to the
Procuracy"9 and prisons.20
Part IV studies the criminal justice system at work in Russia at the dawn of the
twenty-first century and considers the extent of the transition from terror to law.
This section evaluates pre-trial arrest and detention, and the right to counsel afforded
criminal suspects before trial.2' Part IV also assesses the trial procedures of Russia
as they exist a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, highlighting in
particular the roles of defendant and defense counsel, prosecutor, victim, judge, and
jury.,
Part V contemplates the prospects for the achievement of Russia's ultimate goal
of creating a society ruled by laws in the twenty-first century. Of particular
significance are the changes in leadership that occurred in the last days of 1999 and
the resulting changes in the political environment in Russia.3 Part V examines these
changes and their possible influence on the role of existing laws in the
administration of criminal justice and the future prospects for the adoption of
proposed Code of Criminal Procedure dnd other legislation?
14. See infra notes 34-52 and accompanying text (discussing unrestrained powerof the Ministry of Internal
Affairs (NKVD) and the KGB).
15. See infra notes 53-75 and accompanying text (evaluating prison conditions and the use of corrective
labor).
16. See infra notes 76-94 and accompanying text (examining Soviet criminaljustice reforms).
17. See infra notes 103-53 and accompanying text (considering the effectiveness of the Constitution, the
Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Crsmin Code).
18. See infra notes 154-78 and accompanying text (describing functions and power of police in Russia).
19. See infra notes 179-97 and accompanying text (remarking on the role of thm Procuracy in criminal
justice).
20. See infra notes 198-206 and accompanying text (looking at the effects of reform measures on the prison
system).
21. See infra notes 209-24 and accompanying text (discussing the pre-trial process).
22. See infra notes 225-61 and accompanying text (explaining the various roles played in a criminal trial).
23. See infranotes262-339andaccompanyingtext(describingthepolitical structureofRussiaandthegoals
and measures taken by recently elected President Vladimir Putin).
24. See infra notes 340-61 and accompanying text (considering the possible implications of recent politics
on the criminal justice system).
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If. SOVIET JUSTICE AS A FOUNDATION FOR REFORM
After eliminating all pre-revolutionary laws, Soviet leaders spent several years
creating a new legal system.2 The Soviet system, used law "as one more de:,ice to
discipline society and to accomplish [the government's] various political and
economic goals. '' Fundamental to Soviet criminal law was the protection of certain
social values.7 It protected "the social system of the USSR, its political and
economic systems, socialist ownership, the person and rights and freedoms of
citizens, and the entire socialist legal order against criminal infringements."2
25. See FEiDaRuOGE, supra note 8, at 96-99 (highlighting legal developments of the first two decades of
Soviet control); see also id. at 201-04 (explaining the structure of the Soviet court system). Fundamental to the
Soviet system were the constitutional provisions that "[tihe citizen of the USSR is bound.., to respect the rules
of socialist community life... to be intolerant of anti-social behavior, and to promote in every way the protection
of public order." Wim Al bert Tinmermans, Human Rights in Socialist Constitutions: A Comparative Study, in 11M
DIsTNavENEssorSovmTLAw 35,53 (EJ.M. Feldbruggeed., 1987).'The USSRwasahighly centralized, one-
party dictatorship. It enforced a single official ideology; it imposed severe restrictions on national, religious and
cultural self-expression. Its economy was predominantly state-owned." SERvicE, supra note 1, at xxi. The USSR
Constitution guaranteed citizens freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, oftmeetings, and of street marches
and demonstrations, but the exercise of these rights "should be in accordance with the interests of the people and
in order to strengthen and develop the socialist system." See Tumermans, supra at 54. The first Constitution of
the USSR was adopted under Lenin in 1918. See FELDBRUGGE, supra note 8, at 86. The second Constitution was
adopted amid the purges instituted by Stalin in 1934. See iU; see also W.E. BwLR SovmTLAw297-317 (1988);
see also Bassiouni & Savitski, supra note 1. For a discussion ofMarxist theory and early application by Lenin and
Stalin, see Molly Warner Lien, Red Star Trek: Seeking a Rolefor Constitutional Law in Soviet Disunion, 30 STAN.
. IN r'L L. 41, 65-76 (1994).
26. FELDBRUGGE, supra note 8, at 96.
There is no doubt about the fact that during the first decades ofSoviet rule themain purpose ofcriminal
justice was to eradicate opposition to the new regime; hence, the concept of social danger related not
only to the act but also to the person was very welcome indeed, since it enabled the authorities to take
criminal action against any individual they suspected of a counter-revolutionary state of mind...
regarding him s a socially dangerous person.
Frits Gorle, Criminal Law, in iE Dsr3cnVNESS OF SovITLAW 227,236-37 (FJ.M. Feldbrugge ed., 1987).
The Criminal Code of 1926 permitted the use of'measures of social protection ofjudicial-corrective, medical or
medlocopedagogical nature to be used against persons who had either committed socially dangerous acts or
constituted a danger by their links with the criminal milieu or by theirformer activities." See id. at 237 (italics in
original). In theory, the law abandoned this view in 1958 in favor of the idea that social danger attached to the act
not the person. See id. (discussing these theories and explaining that Soviet criminology seemed to operate on the
"concept of the social danger of the delinquent personality" even after 1958).
Although the Soviet Constitution provided guarantees for a myriad of rights, in practice, few of these
rights were ever enforced, and the Soviet courts rarely invalidated government action based upon
constitutionality. The Soviet system was an authoritarian dictatorship where the rule-of-law did not
prevail. Laws, rules, and sentences to labor camps could all be changed at the whim of a Communist
official. The Soviets "could twist the law anyway they liked. When your ten years were up they could
say good, have another ten. Or pack you off to some godforsaken place of exile:'
Scott P. Boylan, TheStatus ofJudiclalReform inRussia. 13 AM. U. Imr'L.REv. 1327,1339-40 (1998) [hereinafter
Boylan, Judicial Refonn].
27. See orle supra note26.at231;seealso id. (comparingapproachest criminallaw andpostulatingthat
a strict definition of crime is undesirable).
28. Id. at231.Tofurthertheprotection ofcertainsocial values, thegovernmentestablished the"All-Union
Institute for the Study of the Causes and Working out Measures for the Prevention of Criminality" and attached it
to the Procuracy in 1963. See Id. at 232. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
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Accordingly, the purposes of punishment were "chastisement for crime," "reform
and re-education of convicted persons," and "prevention of the commission of new
crimes."' 9 While the broad purposes of the Soviet system were the same as many
other criminal systems, the Soviets overlooked justice in writing and enforcing their
laws, 0 and instead used fear and brutality to control the citizenry.
This section focuses on two aspects of the Soviet rule of terror that precipitated
and formed the foundation for post-Soviet Russian reforms. The first of these factors
is the omnipresent role and unfettered power of police in Soviet society."' The
second is the inconsistent, illegal, and savage treatment of prisoners32 In conclusion,
this section reviews reforms to the system initiated in the final decade of Soviet
control.33
A. Soviet Security Agencies
The People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD), later renamed the
Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), and the Commissariat for State Security
(NKGB), later renamed the Ministry of State Security (MGB), were the dominant
police agencies in the Soviet Union from 1934 to 1954.m The MGB conducted
extensive purges of those who opposed the Communist government under Stalin.3
(CPSU) adopted a resolution on August 2, 1979 "on the improvement of the protection of the legal order and the
strengthening of the repression of infringements of the law." Id.
29. Seeid. at252(concludingthatthrewerefourpurposesofpunishrnent:retaliaionre-education,specific
prevention, and general prevention). Punishment was not supposed to "have the purpose of causing physical
suffering or lowering human dignity." Id
30. But see Bassiouni & Savitsld, supra note I (considering criminal laws from the Soviet perspective).
31. See infra notes 34-52 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between Soviet security
agencies and Russian citizens).
32. See infia notes 53-75 and accompanying text (commenting on the legal and extra.legal punishments
available in the USSR).
33. See infra notes 76-94 and accompanying text (considering the role of perestroika in reforming the
criminal justice system and the collapse ofthe USSR).
34. See Ger P. van den Berg, Quantitative Aspects of the Stallnist System ofJustice and Terror in the Soviet
Union, inTHEDSTINC3VENESSoFSOVIEtLAW 97, I00 (OJ.M. Feldbrugge ed., 1987) [hereinafter van den Berg,
Quantitative Aspects]; see also RUssiA: A COUNTRY STuDy 556 (Glenn E. Curtis ed., 1998) [hereinafter Curtis).
In December 1934, the NKVD obtained complete authority "to arest, try and execute at wil:' See SERVIC supra
note 1, at214.Following;WrldWarll the commssariats wer redesignated as ministries. See RcARDL.TRfLL
WoRLD CR IJuscEnSysrEMs: ASuRvEY 309(3rd d. 1997) [hereinafterTtRRILL].
35. See TERtu., supra note 34, at 309; see also Curtis, supra note 34, at 556.
[A] Central Committee document from 1937... said that the Vbronezh secret police, according to the
'regional plan,' repressed in the 'first category" nine thousand people- which means these people were
executed. And for no reason, ofcourse. Twenty-nine thousand were repressed in the 'second category'-
meaning they were sent to labor camps. The local first secretary, however, writes th at there are still more
Trotskyites and kulaks who remain 'unrepressed.' He was saying that the plan was fulfilled but the plan
was notenough! And so he asked that it be increased by eight thousand. Stalin writes back- 'No, i ncrems
by nine thousand!'
REMMCK, supra note 1, at 517-18. "For Stalin, success of the First Five-Year Plan was an occasion for the
intensification rather than the relaxation ofstate violence." SERVlCE, supra note 1, at 195.
The Transnational Lawyer! VoL 13
Extra-judicial repression of persons who were regarded as potential enemies
of the regime had already been instituted by Lenin. It proved itself to be one
of the main devices in building a totalitarian system, reaching full maturity
under Stalin. Vast numbers were executed or sent to labour camps for long
terms .... ."
Following Stalin's death, Party leaders merged the MGB into the MVD 7 In
1954, General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev, in an attempt to distance himself and
the country from Stalin's atrocities, replaced the MVD with the KGB? The KGB's
primary responsibility was "to ensure loyalty to the regime and to suppress all
expressions of political opposition." 39 Khrushchev intended to stop the terror
without destroying the Soviet system ° He permitted a certain level of privacy and
independence not tolerated by Stalin4 But for the citizens, the improvements were
not enough: "life in general remained hard and the political, economic and cultural
order was still extremely authoritarian. '42 This is because, no matter what
Khrushchev intended, the purpose of the KGB was to protect the security of the
36. F=BaRUGaEsupranote8, at202. "IntheStalinistsystemofrepressiontheresimplywerenorestraints
on secret police powers." COLEMAN, supra note 1, at 164. The NKVD "operated as the terror courts of the security
police from the end of 1938 on:' See van den Berg, Quantitative Aspects, supra note 34, at 100.
The impact of the Great Terror was deep and wide and was not limited to specific political,
administrative, military, cultural, religious and national groups. Even a harmless old Russian peasant
woman muttering dissatisfaction with conditions... or... complaints about housing standards would
be dispatched to the horrors of the Gulag. No trace of 'anti-Soviet agitation' was meant to survive.
Casual jokes against Stalin, the communist party or the Soviet state were treated as the most heinous
form of treason. In this fashion practically all Soviet citizens were extirpated who had displayed an
independent mind about public affairs.
SERVICE, supra note 1. at 225.
37. See TERRIL, supra note 34, at 309. The two were again separated a few years later. Id
38. See i& Khrushchev held the position of First Secretary from 1953 to 1964. See Curtis, supra note 34,
at 86, 91; see Id. at 56.86-91, 113,440,481,495.555-56 (discussing Khrushchev's rise to power, foreign policy,
domestic reform efforts, and his role in internal security); see also COLEMN, supra note 1, at 3-63 (considering
Khxushchev's reform efforts and thepoliticsofthe era);see also SERvCE, supra note 1, at334 (considering division
ofthe Ministry ofIntermal Affairs (MVD) into two divisions). The newMVD isresponsible forordinary crimes and
theKGB is responsible for "protection of th USSR'sinternal andexternalsecurity."See hL; see also Curtis, supra
note 34, at 555-56. The Chairman of the KGB was appointed by the Politboro, the chief executive body of the
Soviet Union. See Id at 556. Important decisions regarding security were made by the KGB Collegium, which
included the highest ranking KGB officials, as well as "selected republic and departmental chiefs:' See id.
39. General KGB duties included the following: protection ofSoviet leaders, suppressionofpoliticaldissent
protection ofSovietborders, and perpetuation ofpro-Communist propaganda. See Curtis, supra note 34, at 556-58.
To carry out this mission, the KGB had offices in every city in the Soviet Union. See id. at 556 (discussing the
organization of the KGB and the role it played in the various republics).
40. See SERvIcE, supra note 1, at340 (postulating that Khmshchev's denouncement of Stalin's purges was
to bring about an end to arbitrary punishments while permitting repression of "alternative ideologies').
41. See id at 357 (evaluating increased personal liberties during this time); see also Lien. supra note 25, at
76-79 (considering the effects of Khrushchev's reforms on individual rights).
42. SEvRc-E supra note 1, at 358; see also i& (considering Khrushchev's declining popularity).
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USSR from within by deterring dissent among Soviet citizens4 3 More importantly,
Khrushchev's peers in the government saw him as a weak leader and a threat to
Soviet authority. Consequently, Khrushchev was forcibly ousted in October 1964. 44
Leonid Brezhnev45 revived the fear of Stalinistic rule by keeping the KGB above
the law.46 Secret research by a government employee uncovered documents that
indicated "people were tortured, that their tongues were burned with cigarettes,
43. See TEaRILL, supra note 34, at 293.
Originally, the Soviet government was able to implement this security policy because the people. were
essentially patriotic and nonpolitical. Throughout their history, the Russian people came to respect
power and authority. Whereas most citizens in democratic countries show deference to their law,
Russian citizens display a similar regard for authority. Since such awe of power and authority generally
leads to conformity, freedom... had no place in Soviet society.
Id
The organization's basic purpose was to maintain and extend the power of the Communist Party
throughout the world ... The KGB was also actively involved in the surveillance of its own people in
an attempt to isolate and checkthegrowthofanticommunist feelings among them. It was assisted in this
endeavor by an extensive network of informers strategically situated in all walks of life. A subtle pall
of terrorism hung over every Soviet citizen, since most had a relative or friend who was exiled or
liquidated for anti-Soviet behavior in the past (or knew someone who had). For the estimated 10,000
politically active dissidents that we heard about in the West, the pall was not subtle. Rather the fear was
constant in their lives.
Id. at 310.
44. See id. at 376-78 (discussing the political ousting of Khrushchev by Brezhnev and others In the
government apparatus); see also CoLMAN, supra note 1, at 12 (relating a story regarding Khrushchev's forced
resignation from the former leader's personal memoirs in which he said: "They were able to get rid of me simply
by voting... Stalin would have had them all arrested."). "Khrushchev represented good intentions betrayed by
political stupity. He was the bumptious peasant who dared to undercut the Stalin cult but then lost his way in the
1960s withaseries ofcapricious decisions thatso upset the onservaivesin the Politburo thatthey overthrew hlm."
REMNCK, supra note 1. at 62.
45. Brezhnev was First Secretary from 1964 to 1982. See generally COLEMAN;supra note 1, at 63-217
(considering Brezhnev's domestic and foreign policy).
46. See U at26-27(criticizingBrezhnev's leadership as 'pressive!and"mediocre";;seealso Liensupra
note 25, at 79-82 (reviewing the expansion of laws under Brezhnev).
In the long Soviet nightmare, KGB excesses were unquestionably the worst recurring horrors. To the
secret police, all Soviet citizens were suspected enemies of the state .... Once accused, the victim then
could be kidnapped, tortured, even killed by the secret police, without the slightest hint of legality, let
alone a formal indictment or trial .... KGB agents could be as lawless as the Communist Party leader
of the day let them be.
COLEMAN, supra note 1, at 164. "The regime would rather kill its brightest children than give way. A magnificent
life-support system, with millions of agents, informers, police, wardens, lawyers, and judges all working at its
bedside, kept the old tyrant [the USSR] breathing." RmMcK, supra note 1, at 27. Consider this conversation
between Remnick and a former dissident:
"Every life has a file, ifyou will,"Brodsky told mein his basement apartment, his New York exile. "The
moment you get a little bit well known, they open a file on you. The file begins to get filled up with this
and that, and if you write your file grows in size all the faster It's sort of a Neanderthal form of
computerization. Gradually, your file occupies too much space on the shelf and, quite simply, a man
walks into the office and says, 'This is a big file. Let's get him.'"
Id.; see also d. at 174-75 (mentioning the "neo-Stalinist moveent' under Brezhnev).
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[and] people were forced to stand sixty hours in a row just facing a wall. Prisoners
were beaten so badly that they had to be carried to the firing squad."47
Even under Mikhail Gorbachev," the KGB went unchecked. "Mhe
KGB ... continued to infiltrate every workplace, church, artistic union, and political
group in the Soviet Union... . 'It's got a new image, but it's the same old
horse ... The KGB is everywhere.. ."'5 Gorbachev's motivation to acquiesce to
the KGB seemed to stem from political pressures within the party and his desire to
hold on to his position as General Secretaryl Regardless of his reasons for acting
the way he did, Gorbachev's weakness resulted in Soviet citizens living in constant
fear for their lives and their freedom.52
47. REI ,IcK supra note 1, at 34; see also !& at 31-35 (describing the remarkable secret research projects
of Dnitri Yumsov).
48. Between Brezhnev and Gorbachev, two men held the position of General Secretary. Yuri Andropov,
1982-1984, and Konstantin Chemenko, February 1984- March 1985. See REMNICK, supra note 1, at 191-93; see
also SERVicE, supra note 1, at 428-35 (commenting on the three years under Andropov and Chemenko).
49. See COLEMAN, supra note 1, at 166-70 (examining Gorbachev's submission to the KGB). When
Gorbachev became General Secretary, there were over 200,000 officers in the KGB. See id. at 166. Additionally,
[tihe KGB hadlittle difficulty persuading almostanyone among the SovietUnion's 280 million citizens
to do its bidding, at home or abroad. No Soviet. for example, could get a visa for a trip abroad without
agreeing in advance to cooperate with the KGB during the trip and afterward, at the very least in
supplying requested information. Within the USSR, it was no harder to pressure any Soviet into doing
what the KGB asked, from spying on a neighbor to testifying falsely against a relative, or virtually
anything else. The threat of arrest or worse was always them but rarely needed. Usually it was enough
for an agent to suggest that failure to help the secret police would mean loss of ajob and no prospect of
future work, or loss of a residence permit to live in a major city where food supplies were better, or, if
that didn't work, the KGB could always hint at the danger of an unfortunate accident crossing a street.
Id. at 166-67.
50. REMNICK. supra note 1, at 354-55. But see SERVlCF, supra note 1, at 480 (stating that the KGB "was no
longer arresting citizens for lawful acts of political dissent.).
51. See REM Ic supra note 1, at47-51 (consideringthe controversy relating tothe content of Gorbachev's
national speech on November 2, 1987); see also !& at 194 (quoting Yeltsin's critique of Gorbachev: "[W]hy has
Gorbachev been unable to change this? Ibelieve the fault lies in his basic cast of character. He likes to live well,
in comfort and luxury."). Gorbachev undoubtedly remembered Brezhnev's overthrow of Khrushchev only a few
decades earlier. See id. at 62; see also supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text (considering Khrushchev'sreform
efforts and his fall from grace).
52. See COLEMAN, supra note 1, at4446 (recounting the story of one citizen who was tormented by the
system for over thirty years); see also U at 101-08 (commenting on political dissent and government response);
see also id. at 97-101 (discussing the trial of Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel, writers who dared to criticize the
Communistgovernment, andthebeginnings ofoganizeddissensions). Individuals seen asthreats tothe government
were prevented from leaving the country and were often denied employment. See Ud. at 101-02 (citing the case of
VladirnirSlepak as an example of government treatment of perceived threats). However, it was also against Soviet
law to be unemployed. See i. 'There was always the possibility of arrest and exile to Siberia. See id. at 101-12
(following the stories of three well known dissenters: Orlov, Ginzburg, and Shcharansky). Government reactions
to the dissenters included arrest, exile, prohibitions on travel, and forced emigration. See Ut. Despite the horror,
"it]he barbaric suppression of dissent never killed [the dissident movement]. On the contrary, the repressions only
increased the demands for reform until they at last toppled the Soviet systemW" Id. at 112.
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B. Punishment Soviet Style
Officials had abroad range of options, both legal and otherwise, at their disposal
when determining punishments. Enemies of the state could be sent to prison, labor
camps, psychiatric hospitals, or sentenced to corrective labor, exile, or deportation.53
Sentences to deprivation of freedom, served either in prisons or corrective labor
camps,'4 ranged from three months to fifteen years.5s In theory, a sentence to a labor
camp was determinate, but the government could easily prolong detention past the
designated release date.56 In fact, some individuals were sent to labor camps were
never heard from again.Y
Soviet leadership preferred the use of labor camps over traditional prisons." The
labor camps consisted of a quadra-tiered system ranging in the degree of severity.59
Jobs performed by inmates were increasingly difficult and demanding and rations
were more scarce at the camps higher up in the system.6 Life as a prison or labor
camp inmate began with a month long train ride in cattle cars to the outer edges of
53. See SERVICE, supra note 1, at 412 (recounting the story ofa dissident who faced multiple punishments,
including hospitalization, conviction for parasitism, and forced emigration).
54. See BUTLER, supra note 25, at 329 (categorizing correctional institutions as correctional labor colonies,
prisons, and educational labor colonies).
55. See Gorle, supra note26, at255. A deprivation-of-freedom sentence could be a "condition," indicating
suspension of the confinement portion of the sentence but still subjecting the individual to forced labor for the
period of the sentence. See iU; see also BUTLER. supra note 25, at 331 (describing the terms of conditional
sentences).
56. See van den Berg, Quantitative Aspects, supra note 34, at 104-05 (defining the basic terms relating to
corrective laborand differentiating between "camp inmates" and "deported persons"); see also SERVlcE, supra note
1, at 251 (commenting on the origination of "voluntary-compulsory retention").
57. See REMNIcK, supra note 1, at 22 (citing jiust one example of the disappearance of a perceived political
enemy).
58. See Curds, supra note 34, at 582. During the 1980s about 99% of criminals served time in labor camps
as opposed to prisons. See id.; see also COLEMAN, supra note 1, at 183-86 (discussing the city of Perm and the
Gulag prison camps named after the city); see also GER P. VAN DEN BERG, THE SOVIT SYSrEM OF JusnCE.
FIGums AND POLICY 109-36 (1985) [hereinafter vAN DEN BERG, THESoviETSYSTEM] (defining and explaining
corrective laborstatistics from 1930-1980). Although the numbers cannotbe confirmed, estimatesof thepopulation
of corrective labor camps under Stalin range from 5 million to over 20 million. See van den Berg, Quantitative
Aspects, supra note34, at 103; seealso id at 106-41 (attemptingto calculate the possible population of laborcamps
from 1928-1958). The preference for corrective labor found its roots in the overcrowding of prisons following the
Revolution and Civil War. See VAN DEN BER, THE Sovie SYsri, supra at 87. A decree adopted on March 26,
1928 urged the use of corrective laborin place of short term prison sentences. See U Another factor supporting the
use of corrective labor was the New Economic Policy establiihed in 1929, which called for prisons and labor
colonies to be self-sufficient. See id. at 88; see also SERVICE, supra note 1, at 123-49 (discussing the New Economic
Policy and its effects).
59. See Curtis, supra note 34, at 589.
60. See d. at 588-91 (explaining the structure of and conditions in labor camps). Inmates in labor camps
were confined to the camp, where they lived separate from the rest of society; however, their work could be Inside
or outside the camp or even in businesses where camp management contracted to provide free labor. See van den
Berg, QuantitativeAspects, supra note 34, at 104.
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the country.61 Once they reached their destination, inmates suffered in "prisons and
labor camps [that] were notorious for their harsh conditions, arbitrary and sadistic
treatment of prisoners, andflagrant abuses of human rights."6 They received barely
enough food to sustain a sedentary lifestyle yet were constantly forced into physical
labor.6 ' Besides the inadequacy of food supplies, inmates received limited clothing
and medical treatment.64 Inmates were deprived of any hint of human respect.
Sometimes inmates were moved from camp to camp just to keep them from getting
comfortable and having any kind of stability in their liveso
The use of corrective labor, beyond the camp system, became prevalent in the
1970s.66 Courts and administrative agencies could sentence individuals to the
performance of "corrective tasks" at any location as long as the individual could get
back to his own home at the end of the day.6 The Soviet government also used
psychiatric hospitals as prisons' Political dissidents often spent years in these
hospitals. 9
The Soviet government also relied heavily on internal deportation to control
citizens perceived to be enemies of the social state. 0 Although families sometimes
accompanied a deported person, relocation was forcible and the individual was
responsible for finding his or her own employment in the "administrative region."7'
Courts or administrative agencies could issue deportation sentences.7
61. See REMcKsupra note 1, at 121-23 (analogizingtheliveso f inmnatesto those ofslaves andlivestock);
see also SER VIc , supra note 1. at 223-24 (remarking on the secrecy of these journeys and their abhorrent
consequences).
62. SeeCurtis.supranote34,at589.inmateswerevictimsof"venal andbruta"guards.SeeSERv cF, supra
note 1, at 382.
63. See SEvRicE, supra note 1. at 224.
64. Seeid
65. See RE MNIC, supra note 1, at 108. The government also wanted to prevent dissidents from spreading
"anti-Soviet ideas:' See id. The KGB also tried to get prisoners to repent their dissident ideas. See SEmVI, supra
note 1. at 382.
66. See VAN DEN BERG, THE SovIET SYsTEM, supra note 58, at 98-99 (relating the use of"exile labor" as
an alternative to laborcamps). A sentence to exile Iaborresultedin havingto workwhereverone was sentby police.
See IR This allowed the government to fully utilize forced labor without having to expend the resources to support
another prisoner. See id. at 98; see also B UTLER, supra note 25, at 331-32 (comparing correctional confinement to
correctional tasks).
67. See van den Berg, Quantitative Aspects, supra note 34, at 105; see also Gorne, supra note 26, at 255.
68. See REmNiCK, supra note 1, at 57. "Medicine became an arm of coercive state control as doctors were
instructed to expect an influx of cases of 'paranoiac schizophrenia' shortly before public festivals..." SERVIC
supra note 1, at 382.
69. See SERviCE, supra note 1, at 382.
70. See Gone, supra note 26 at 255 (distinguishing between exile, requiring the individual to live in a
particular area, andbanishment, prohibiting an individual fromliving in acertain area); seealsoBuTLER, supra note
25. at 331 (discussing exile and banishment).
71. See van den Berg, QuantitativeAspects, supra note 34, at 105.
72. See d Courts could only issue determinate sentences but"administrative deportation orders could also
be issued without a time limit." kl
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Worse than the legal options available for sentencing of convicted persons were
the extra-legal punishments utilized.73 The power held by the government resulted
in constant fear on the part of Soviet citizens. They never knew when the police
might come for them or when they would see an arrested loved one again.74 "In
making a secret of history, the Kremlin made its subjects just a little more insane,
a little more desperate. 75 Dissatisfaction with the government grew among the
general populous and the government began to recognize that something had to be
done.
C. Perestroika
Perestroika began with a broad idea "that some things could be improved: more
democracy, elections, more in the newspapers-limited, but slightly more open-the
management system should be improved, centralization should be less strict, power
should be redistributed somewhat, maybe functions of the Party and the government
should be divided." '76 In the beginning, the goal of perestroika was to reduce
economic waste, not to change to the fundamental system of communism; however,
the system could not withstand the whirlwind of change it initiated.7
One year after taking office, Gorbachev initiated reforms to the Procuracy that
focused on the individual rights of citizens.7 8 Later, he expanded the individual right
to judicial review and strengthened judicial independence.7 9 Gorbachev also
established the Committee of Constitutional Supervision (CCS). The CCS was the
first institution in Russian history responsible for reviewing the constitutionality of
73. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (discussing legal sentencing requirements and the
govemment's ability to go around these requirements); see also supra note l and accompanying text (considering
the suffering of a convicted person's family).
74. See REMNiCK, supra note 1, at 101.
In the Soviet Union, an empire of holocaust survivors and the children of survivors, this gnawing
uncertainty was the usual condition of fe.. . "The concentration camp, by making death itself
anonymous (making it impossible to find out whiether a prisoner is dead or alive), robbed the death of
its meaning as theend of afilfilled life."Iamnot sure wemet anyone whodid nothaveagrandparent,
a parent, a sibling, a friend, someone who still wandered through his dreams, still ghostly because there
was no way to fix the dead ones end in time and place..., the suffering continues because there Is no




76. See id. at 297 (quoting Yakovlev. a former leader in the Communist party, on the origins and
development of perestroika); see also !d& at 297-300 (commenting on the course of perestroika); see also SERVIE
supra note 1, at 448-553 (evaluating the ideals of glasnost and perestroika and the subsequent social changes).
77. See Louise Shelley, Crim nal Law and Justice Since Brezhnev, in LAWANDrIIEGORACIMVER4 183,
189 (Donald D. Barry ed., 1988) [hereinafter Shelley, Criminal Law and Justice]; see also SeRVICE, supra note 1,
at466; see also i. at485-507 (discussing the final years of perestroika and the inevitable collapse of the USSR).
78. See Lien, supra note 25, at 83-84 (identifying the transfer of power within the Procuracy).
79. See id at 84.
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government actions.8° While perestroika led to unprecedented protections of
individual rights within the Soviet Union, the government "still disregarded these
rights if their exercise conflicted with the political interests of the state."'
Although Gorbachev officially incorporated criminal law into perestroika in
1987,2 perestroika was significant not because of its effect on criminal justice but
because it was at the core of the controversy that finally brought down the entire
Soviet system. 3 The 1990 removal of the constitutional provision that gave the
Communist party the "leading" role in the government of the USSR was among the
contested changes made during perestroika that foreshadowed the collapse of the
Soviet system.8
80. I at 85. CCS is responsible for "ensuring the protection of constitutional rights, and keeping the
republics in line with the central authorities' policy inlegal matters." See Peter B. Maggs, TheRussian Courtsand
the Russian Constitution, Address Before the Association of the Bar in the City of New York (Spring 1997), in 8
IND. INT'L& COMP. L. REV. 99,101 (1997).
81. Lien, supra note 25, at 87-88. Despite his dedication to reform, Gorbachev, like all Soviet leaders,
"attempted to censor criticism of his regime:' Id. at 88.
82. Reforms of this period focused on controlling crime, not the abuses suffered by the system's victims.
See Shelley, Criminal Law and Justice, supra note 77, at 189-96 (highlighting a few of Gorbachev's campaigns
against crime and theincreasing severity of criminal penalties). One positive change expanded the right to counsel.
See Foglesong, supra note 10, at 557. Gorbachev also repealed laws against "anti-Sovietagitation" and "anti-Soviet
propaganda." See Anatolyi V. Naumov, The New Russian Criminal Code as a Reflection of Ongoing Reforms, 8
CRIM.L.F. 191,193 (1997).Tewere alsoreformsfromwithin the courtsystem. In December 1996, the Supreme
Court issued a decree entitled "On the Further Strengthening of Legality for the Realization of Justice," for the
purpose of eliminating "serious shortcomings and omissions" of the judiciary. See RAND, supra note 1, at 28.
Discussions regarding draft revisions of theUSSR Fundamental Principles of Cdminal Law began in 1988, but the
Supreme Soviet (the Soviet Parliament) did not accept the draft as a replacement for the previous provisions until
July 2, 199 1. See William .Butler & lane F. Henderson, Introductory Note to the Criminal Code of the Russian
Federation, in RUSSIA LEGAL TxS 593 (William E. Butler & Jane . Henderson eds., 1998) [hereinafter
Introduction tothe Criminal Code].The Supreme Sovietpassed theFundamental Principlesin 1991, but thechange
was not scheduled to take effect until July 1992. However, the USSR dissolved in the interim: thus, the Principles
never became effective. See idU The coup in August 1991 and the subsequent breakup of the-USSR also prevented
legislation from taking effect that would have created the first Soviet juries. See Duncan DeVille, Combating
Russian Organized Crime: Russia's Fledgling Jury System on Trial, 32 GEO. WASH. J3.IN'L L & ECON. 73, 78
(1999); see also Schroeder, supra note 6, at 187-91 (considering the incorporation ofcriminal law into perestroika);
see also Shelley, Criminal LawandJustice, supra note77, at 189-204 (consideringcriminal law under Gorbachev).
83. In fact, the only amendment was to the chapter of the Constitution dealing with fundamental rights.See
Feldbrugge, supra note 8, at 215. There was actually a movement away from the liberation of the criminaljustice
systems around the end of 1989. See RAND, supra note I, at 84-93 (examining the effects of perestroika on crime
and the criminaljustice system).
84. See Hiroshi Oda, Recent Developments in Party Control Over the Courts and the Procuracy, in THE
EMANCPATION OF SovIET LAW 239,239-48 (FJ.M. Feldbrugge ed., 1992) (explaining the fundamental changes
within the government of the Soviet Union during 1988 and 1989) [hereinafter Oda, Recent Developments]. The
1990 constitutional amendment made the CommunistParty equal to otherpolitical parties. See FmLBRUGGa, supra
note 8, 104-05; see also id, at 63.126 (crediting Gorbachev with significant reforms to the system of government
in the Soviet Union). However. the Party maintained its control over the country for a short time following the
19990 amendment. See REmNicK, supra note 1, at 514-15.
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Creation of the position of President of Russia also signaled movement away
from the traditional totalitarian system of the USSR.8s In March 1991, Boris Yeltsin,
then chairman of the Republican Parliament of Russia, added a question to
Gorbachev's referendum regarding the unity treaty on the issue of direct elections
for the Russian President." In June of 1991, Russia held its first free Presidential
election.Y Russia's exercise of its independence in this way is an indication of the
insolvency of the USSR and all it stood for.88
Reforms of the era "played an important role in establishing and strengthening
mechanisms that ensured the legality of governmental conduct. However... they
did not fully protect the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.8 9 Lack of universal
support among Party members for political and economic goals partially explains
the weakness in perestroika. Gradually, politics ate away at Gorbachev's
dedication to broad reforms.9' The dilution of reform cost the Party millions of
members. 2 The country was being torn in two directions. It could not survive the
calls for both totalitarianism and democracy. This fight consequently destroyed the
Soviet Union.93 The Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR met for the last
time in September 1991. 9
Ell. OVERVIEW OF THE RUSSIAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the independent Russian
government had to decide how to reconcile the ideology of freedom with the
85. See FELDBRUGGE, supra note 8. at 177-80 (comparing the authority of the President to that of the
Parliament and considering the differences in the position between the USSR and the Russian Soviet Federal
Socialist Republic (RSFSR)).
86. See REM cK, supra note 1, at 420; see also SERViC supra note 1, at 494.
87. See William E. Butler & lane E. Henderson, Introductory Note to the Constitution of the Russian
Federation, in RUssIAN LEaAL TEXs 1, 1 (William E. Butler & Jane B. Henderson eds., 1998) [hereinafter
Introduction to the Constitution]. The position of President was created in April 1991. See id Boris Yeltsin was
elected to the position andheldituntil heresigned onDecember3l,1999. SeeP'.WERUG supra note 8, at 104-
05.
88. See FE.BRUGGE, supra note 8, at 104-05.
89. Lien, supra note 25, at 87.
90. See REMNICK, supra note 1, at 296-371 (reviewing the political struggles associated with perestrolka).
91. See id at 371. Gorbachev withdrew support for the proposed 500 Days program because of oppositon
among the KGB and the military. See id
92. See id. at 377 (commenting on thealienation of reform-minded party members).
93. Gorbachev's opponents in the party orchestrated a coup in August 1991. See id at 437-88 (discussing
the events of the summer of 1991). Under Yeltsin's guidance, the Russian people resisted the forces behind the
coup. See i, Gorbachev's power was terminally wounded by the coup while Yeltsin's powersoared. See Id. at494-
98.
94. See id at 498. The Congress of Peoples Deputies and the Supreme Soviet composed the Parliament of
the USSR. The Russian Constitution of 1993 changed their names to the Statec Duma and the Federation Council,
which arecollectively called theFederal Assembly. Throughout this Comment, these bodies may be referred to as
the Parliament, Assembly, the Legislature, orby their given names,
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outdated criminal justice system of the Soviet republic 5 This section considers the
legislative basis of the criminal justice system of Russia,' reviews the reallocation
of power to post-Soviet security agencies,7 evaluates post-Soviet changes to the
Procuracy and its complicated role in the Russian criminal justice system," and
examines reforms relating to the treatment of prison inmates."
A. Constitution and Codification of Criminal Laws
This section examines the strengths and weaknesses, relative to the criminal
justice system, of the Constitution of the Russian Federation adopted in 1993, °° the
Soviet Code of Criminal Procedure of 1960,01 and the 1997 Criminal Code of the
Russian Federation. 1°2
1. Constitution
On September 21, 1993, President Yeltsin, frustrated by the constant conflicts
between himself and the Parliament, issued Edict 1400, "On the Step by Step
Constitutional Reform of the Russian Federation.l '' ° The first step in the President' s
reform plan was to dissolve the ParliamentY14 He then adopted, on October 1 and
15 respectively, edicts calling for elections of a new Federal Assembly and a
referendum to adopt a new Constitution.1°
95. SeenItoductiontothe Constitution, supranote87,at 1.Oneofthe first steps taken by P:rsidentYltsin
was to outlaw the Communist party and seize its property in the fall of 1991. See REMCK, supra note 1, at 504;
see also SEVIvC, supra note l, at 505. However, it is important to note that members ofthe Party continued to hold
positions in the goverment without denouncing the ideas of the Party. See REMNICK. supra note 1, at 504-05.
96. See infranotes 103-53andaccompanyingtext(commentingontheConstitutiontheCriminal Code, and
the Code of Criminal Procedure).
97. See infra notes 154-78 and accompanying text (discussing the structure and power ofRussian security
agencies).
98. See Infra notes 179-97 and accompanying text (mentioning reforms affecting the Procuracy).
99. Seeinfranotes 198-206andaccompanyingtext(discussingtrealmentofinmatesandsanitaryconditions
in prisons).
100. See infra notes 103-13 (considering the adoption and effect of the Constitution).
101. See infranotes 114-27 and accompanying text (expressing the need fora new criminal procedure code).
102. See infra notes 128-53 and accompanying text (commenting on the political debates surrounding the
Criminal Code and comparing the Code to Soviet law).
103. See Introduction to the Constitution, supra note 87, at I (considering the discordbetween the President
and the Parliament). For a further explanation ofthe conflicts between thePresident andtheParliament, andtlrole
of the Constitutional Court, see Lien. supra note 25, at 89-103. See generally Herbert Hausmaninger, Towards a
"New" Russian Constitutional Court, 28 CORNELINT'LLJ. 349 (1995) (evaluating the role of the Constitutional
Court throughout the 1990s).
104. See Introduction to the Constitution, supra note 87, at 1.
105. See iU Both edicts called for voting to take place on December 12. See Ud. The Constitution was drafted
during the sununer of 1993 and published for discussion on November 10, one month after the edict calling for the
referendum.SeeId. Drafts foranowConstitutionwerealreadyincirculationbeforeYeltsin sedicts. SeeLiensupra
note 25, at 104-07.
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In some ways, the Constitution resembles those of the Soviet regime by creating
a strong executive branch "to an extent that will render meaningless any
constitutional limitations in the presence of an executive who chooses to disregard
them."1 Among the President's powers are the rights to "dissolve and call elections
for the State Duma" and "use dispute-settlement procedures to resolve differences
between other organs of state power."1 7 Legislative and judicial review of
presidential actions is severely limited by the Constitution.t0 8
However, a more detailed comparison between the 1993 Constitution and its
Soviet predecessors shows that the new Constitution denounces old Soviet ideas in
many respects."°9 "Whereas constitutions of the former Soviet Union spoke of
citizen's rights, in reality rights were vested in the state and citizens were accorded
a series of obligations. With this Constitution the roles are reversed.""' 0 The new
Constitution gives citizens the right to travel abroad and legally return to Russia, as
contrasted with the previous Soviet system; furthermore, the new Constitution
permits citizens to travel freely within the country and live where they choose."'
Additional rights include freedom of speech, freedom of the press, free association,
and the right to assemble." 2 The Constitution also addresses judicial procedures
106. Lien, supra note 25, at 110.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 111-13 (stating that"the only limitation on executive power is the provision which states thatpresidential decrees may not contravene the Constitution or federal laws:'). However, the provisions for ch allengtng
a decree as unconstitutional are unclear. See id,
109. See Introduction to the Constitution, supra note 87, at 2 (commenting on several provisions of the
Constitution that directly contradict Communist ideology and Soviet methodology). Most notable are provisions
maldngtheConstitution directly applicablewithoutthcenactmentofadditiona legislation, requiringlaws published
to be valid, recognizing state independence, and integrating of generally recognized principles and norms of
international law.See id. Although the Constitution protects citizens againstthe arbitrary exercise of police powers,
otherreform measures expandpolicepowers.See Curtis, supra note 34, at 583. The "UrgentMeasures tolmplement
the Program to Step Up the Fight Against Crime," added 52,000 troops to the MVD Internal Troops, increased
coordination between the FSK, MVD, andother law enforcement agencies, and broadened police powers to search
and to carry weapons. See id. at 583-84. Under this decree, detention of suspects for up to 30 without pressing
charges is allowed, during which time police can interrogate suspects and inspect their financial records. See Id. at
583. Agents of the national intelligence services also have the right to "enter any premises without a warrant, to
exanine private documents, andto search automobiles, their drivers, and their passngers."Id. TheMVD and FSK
engaged in sweeping enforcement efforts in 1994. See itd at 584. In July 1995, the Assembly passed the "Law on
Operational-Investigative Activity" to replace Article 70. See id. The new law added to the list of agencies that
could conduct criminal investigations and broadened their authority in conducting investigations. See t!
110. TERRELL, supra note 34, at 301.
Article 2 declares: "Human beings and theirrights and liberties ar the supreme values. Therecognitin,
observance and protection of human and civil rights and liberties is the obligation of the state." Article
7 states: "The Russian Federation is a social state whose policy is aimed at creating conditions that
ensure a dignified life for human beings and their free development."
Id. Other articles in Chapter 1 "recognize diversity of ideas and religious beliefs, guarantee freedom in economic
endeavors and acknowledge private forms of ownership." I.
111. See Morshchakova, supra note 10, at 748-50.
112. See Lien. supra note 25, at 109; see also TERRui, supra note 34, at 293 (providing that Soviet
Constitutions also included provisions for free speech, press, and assembly, subject in practice to the KGB's control
of the exercise of theserights). Chapter 2 provides a list of47 categories of specific individual rights, including the
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relevant to criminal defendants, creating the right to a jury trial in certain
circumstances to be defined in later legislation, extending the right to counsel to pre-
trial detention, providing for the presumption of innocence, and prohibiting self-
incrimination and double jeopardy.113
2. Code of Criminal Procedure
Russia is still operating under the Code of Criminal Procedure adopted in 1960
as Khrushchev attempted to rid the country of Stalin's violent oppression."' The
Code, which is organized to follow the course of a criminal case, has eight sections:
(1) general provisions, (2) initiation of the case, (3) investigation, (4) trial court
proceedings, (5) appellate proceedings, (6) execution and judgment, (7) review of
judgements and rulings that have taken effect, and (8) proceedings against minors.1 5
Gorbachev and Yeltsin frequently amended the Code in the late 1980s and
throughout the 1990s. The amendments reflected changes in societal attitudes. One
such change was the movement away from oppressive totalitarianism in
government, which led to amendments that "make criminal proceedings more
democratic and more respectful of the basic civil rights of the accused.""1 6 At the
same time, "the general destabilization of society and the concomitant rise in crime
required the introduction of more effective procedural institutions. ' 17 As a result,
the Code remained decidedly prejudiced in favor of the prosecution in that "[ilt
denied the defendant a shield against prosecutorial abuse and guaranteed the
government an advantage once the trial got under way." '
Despite over four hundred amendments to the Code, articles addressing arrest
and detention are essentially the same as those originally adopted in 1960.9
Article 122 of the Code, which spells out the circumstances under which an
arrest (zaderzhanie) of a suspect can be made, gives considerable discretion
to the officials and agencies authorized to make such arrests. In addition to
the grounds for warrantless arrests that exist in most countries... the Code
also empowers police to arrest citizens when they possess "other
following: freedom from torture and involuntary medical experimentation, limitations on pre-trial detention,
protections for the confidentiality of personal communications, and restrictions on entry into personal residences
by government agents. See i at 301-02 (mentioning a few of the rights enumerated in the Constitution).
113. See lien, supra note 25, at 109.
114. Seesuprarnotes38-44(consideringreformsunderKhrushchev).ButseeTERRlsupranote34, at349
(discussing opinions that the Code was not really different from those in force under Stalin).
115. S'eeTE. -RML supranote 34, at 348; see also FELDRUGGFsupra note 8, at 315-17; see also Foglesong.
supra note 10, at 553 (explaining that the Code is organized to follow the process of a criminal case).
116. FELDBRUrG, supra note 8, at 315.
117. Id.
118. RAND. supra note 1, at 33.
119. Foglesong, supra note 10, at 552-53.
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information" (inye dannye) giving them reasons to suspect individuals of
a crime. 2°
Thus, the Code remains inconsistent with the Constitution.121 For instance, Article
22 of the Constitution limits the time a criminal suspect can be detained without
review of the case, but the Code permits the same agency, the Procuracy, to order
and review detention.12 Secondly, even though there is now a constitutional right
to counsel from the moment of arrest, the Code does not require the investigating
officer notify the suspect of this right until the decision to prosecute is made.'2
Finally, the prosecutor has the right to appeal acquittals which may violate the
double jeopardy clause of the Constitution.U
The Duma passed a new Code of Criminal Procedure in the summer of 1997.12
However, President Yeltsin vetoed that Code.'2 Yeltsin and the Assembly never
agreed on a new Code, thus leaving the adoption of a new Code of Criminal
Procedure to the new administration.2 7
120. lId Additional reasons for warrantiess arrests include lack of a permanent residence and Inability to
provide proof of identity. See id at 553.
121. SeeMaggssupranote58 at IOD-1(comparingappicationoftheConsitutionandthe Code ofCr nal
Procedure). Consider the following concerns about applying various protections of the Constitution:
Article 15 states: "Bodies of state power, bodies of local self-government, officials, citizens and
associations of citizens, must observe the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the laws." Article
46 proclaims: "Everyone is guaranteed judicial protection ofhis or her rights and liberties:' Article 49
indicates: "Everyone accused ofommitting a crime is presumed innocent until hisorherguilthas been
proved according to the procedure stipulated by federal law and established by a court verdict that has
entered into force. An accused person is not obligated to prove his or her innocence." Finally, Article
50 assures: "No one maybe convicted more than once for the same crime:' Sore ofthes constitutional
rights are strikingly similar to the protections enunciated in the old Code of Criminal Procedure of the
RSFSR. As aresult, there is some uncertainty as to whether the agents of thejustice system will display
a deference toward these constitutional rights. At issue is whether the agents ofthejustice system have
accepted the principle ofgovermnment by rule of law.
TERIut, supra note 34, at 349.
122. See TnMuLL, supra note 34, at 350 (comparing application of Article 122 of the Code and Article 22
of the Constitution).
123. See id. at 351 (commenting on Article46 of the Code and Article 48 of the Constitution); see also infra
notes 216.22 and accompanying text (discussing the pre.trial right to counsel).
124. See Stephen C. Thaman, Europe's New Jury Systems: The Cases of Spain andRussia, 62SPG LAW &
CoNTEmp. PROBS. 233,248 (1999) [hereinafter Thaman, Jury Systems]; see also Boylan, Judicial Reform, supra
note 26, at 1340-41 (contemplating whether prosecutorial appeals violate the doublejeopardy clause). Acquittals
were almost unheard of during the Soviet years. See RAND, supra note 1, at 2. Moreover, because the currently
applicable Code is merely an amended Soviet Code, "there is skepticism regarding the ability or willingness of
agents of the Russianjustice system to comply with [the Code's] procedural protections." TeIPLL, supra note
34, at 349.
125. See Stanislaw Pomorski, Reflections on the first Criminal Code ofPost-Communist Russia, 46 AM. L
CoMp. L. 375,375 n.5 (1998).
126. Boris Yeltsin Vetoes Amendments to Code of Criminal Procedure, Code of Civil Procedure and Code
of Administratively Punishable Violations, WHAT 7HE PAPERS SAY, Jan. 29, 1997, available In LEXIS, Russia
library, News file.
127. See inf-a notes 262-333 and accompanying text (discussing changes in leadership and what President
Putin has done since he took office).
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3. Criminal Code
The Criminal Code of the RSFSR, adopted on October 27, 1960, elaborated on
the 1958 Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law of the USSR.128 Political
discussions regarding passage of a new criminal code began in the late years of the
Soviet era.'29 In that direction, the Criminal Code underwent extensive revisions
between 1989 and 1992. A number of "crimes" were completely removed from the
Criminal Code during this transition, many of which closely related to the
oppressive nature of Soviet totalitarianism. 30 However, the structure and approach
to criminal law remained the same. 131
In 1995, the Russian government began to actively pursue adoption of a new
criminal code. 32 This section reviews specific provisions of the Code that became
effective on January 1,1997133 and evaluates some of the issues that may prevent the
Code from effecting real reform.3'
128. See Introduction to the Criminal Code, supra note 82, at593;see also Curtis, supra note 34, at 583; see
also Hi roshiOda, Crim inal Law Reform in the So viet Union Under Stalin, in THED STiN CVE NESS OF SOVIE LAw
77 (FJ.M. Feldbrugge ed., 1987) [hereinafter Oda, Criminal LawReform] (recounting attempts to amend the Soviet
Criminal Code from 1927 to 1944).
129. See Introduction to the Criminal Code, supra note 82, at 593. 'The adoption of a Criminal Code
appropriate to market social and economic conditions was regarded as an essential step in the transition to a market
economy. Discussions of fundamental reforms of the criminal law were well advanced by 1988, when ... draft
Fundamental Principles ofcrimin al legislation [was] published."Id. Efforts expended on theFundamental Principles
served as the foundation for the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. See id.
130. See FIBRUGO., supra note 8, at 309 (citing anti-Soviet propaganda, private enterprise, and "crimes
against the separation of church and stte" as a few examples).
131. See iU
132. See Id Two drafts of the new code were submitted to the Duma in 1994, one by the Office of the
President and one by Duma deputies. See i The Duma created a working group to reconcile the two drafts, and
on July 19,1995, the Duma adopted the working group's version. See id The Duma then sent the adopted code to
the Council of the Federation forits approval See Introduction to the Criminal Code, supra note 82, at 593; see also
Naumov, supra note 82, at 197-98. While the Council was still considering the Code, the Duma sent it to the
President for his signature, but President Yeltsin refused to sign it "on the grounds that the original text was with
the Council of the Federation and he was not authorised [sic] to sign a 'copy."' See Introduction to the Criminal
Code, supra note 82, at 593. The Council finally acted by rejecting the Code on October 4,1995. See id. However,
during the three months between the time the Council received the Code and the time it rejected the Code, the time
limit imposed by the 1993 Constitution lapsed and "the Council was deemed to have approved the bill: See i
Following rejection by both the Council and the President, the Dumna reconsidered the Code. See id. On November
2,1995. the Duma again votedto adopt the Code, but on December 6,1995, President Yeltsin again refused to sign
it. See id. This timelhe said it was not sufficiently linked to the Code of Criminal Procedure and that it was missing
vital provisions. See id, at593-94; see also Curtis, supra note 34, at 583. It is useful to know thatthe MVD opposed
the Code. See US at 583 (hypothesizing that the President's vote was at least partially based on political pressure
from MVD officials). A conciliation commission was established to revise the Code. See Introduction to the
Criminal Code, supra note 82, at 594. The Duma received and adopted the revised draft on May 24, 1996, and the
Council approved it less than a month later. See id President Yeltsin finally signed the Code into law on June 13,
1996. See id,
133. See infra notes 135-46 and accompanying text (describing the Code).
134. See infra notes 147-53 and accompanying text (comparing the Code to Soviet practices).
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The Criminal Code is divided into two main parts, the General Part and the
Special Part.L35 The General Part focuses on defining concepts and types of criminal
responsibility and punishments. 36 As might be expected, the Special Part then
breaks down specific criminal acts and their corresponding punishments.137
The General Part begins with Section I which details the tasks, principles, and
operations of the Code.138 Sections H and HI then define concepts and types of
criminal activity, and concepts and assignment of punishments.3 9 Finally, Sections
IV through VI deal with relief from criminal responsibility and punishment and
include specific provisions regarding minors and individuals who are mentallyincompetent. t'
135. See generally Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, in RUSSIAN LEGALTE= 594-766 (William
F. Butler & Jane E. Henderson eds. 1998) [hereinafter Criminal Code].
136. See id. at 594-642. The General Part is further divided into 6 sections and 104 articles. See id.
137. See id. at 642-766. The Special Part includes 12 sections and 256 articles. See id
138. According to Article 2(1), the purpose of the Code is the "protection ofthe rights and freedoms of man
and citizen, ownership, public order and public security, the environment, and the constitutional system of the
Russian Federation against criminal infringements, ensuring the peace and security of mankind, and also the
prevention of crime." Id. at 594. The Code goes on, in Article 6. to say that punishment must be 'just." See i at
595 (definingjust punishments as those that"correspond to the character and degree of social danger of the crime,
the circumstances of committing it, and the personality of the guilty person:). Article 7(2) further requires that
punishments "may nothaveas theirpurpose thecausing ofphysical sufferings orthe demeaning ofhuman dignity."
Id
139. Article 14 defines criinalconduct as"[a] socially dangerous act committed guiltily which is prohibited
by the present code under threat of punishment...." Id. at 598. However, "an action (or failure to act), although
formally containing indicia of any act provided for by the present Code but by virtue of insignificance does not
represent a social danger, that is, has not caused harm nor created a threat of causing harm to the person, society,
or the State, shall not be a crime." Id. at598. Article3g specifically focuses on the liability that attaches for harming
a criminal suspect in custody, causing liability to attach only if the harm caused "was clearly excessive and not
called forby the situation" and then only ifthe harm was caused intentionally. See id, at 608-09. Article 44 lists the
possible punishments:
(a) fine;
(b) deprivation of the right to occupy determined posts or to engage in a determineal activity;
(c) deprivation of special, military or honorary title, class rank, or State awards;
(d) obligatory tasks;
(e) correctional tasks;
(f) limitation in military service;
(g) confiscation of property;
(h) limitation of fiedom;
(i) arrest;
(j) confinement in disciplinary military unit;
(k) deprivation of freedom for determined period;
(I) deprivation of freedom for life;
(m) death penalty.
Id. at 610-11. Article 60 requires that punishments of the least necessary severity should be used and that the
circumstances of the crime should be considered in deciding the punishment. See I at 618.
140. Articles 75-78 set forth a number of conditions that under certain circumstances, can relievc an
individual of criminal responsibility. See i& at 627-28 (establishing the circumstances in which repentance,
reconciliation, change in situation, or statutes of limitations relieve an individual from criminal responsibility for
otherwise criminal conduct). Relief from punishment is also possible under Articles 79-83. See i. at 629-32
(allowing conditional early relief or reduction of punishment if the current severity of punishment is no longer
necessary for rehabilitation).
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The Special Part of the Criminal Code separates criminal activity into six main
categories: (1) crimes against the person, Section VII;41 (2) economic crimes,
Section VIII;"14 (3) crimes against public security and order, Section IX;143 (4)
crimes against state power, Section X;14 (5) crimes against military service, Section
X; 41 (6) and crimes against peace and security of mankind, Section XII."4
The Code "represents a major effort at discarding a lawless and repressive
Soviet legacy and joining the mainstream of progressive penological cultures."1 47
The basic values of the Russian Code are different from those of its Soviet
predecessor:
[The new Code] rejects the priority of governmental interests over the
interests of the individual.... [it] puts interests of the individual, above all
his life, liberty and autonomy, at the top of the hierarchy of values.
Consequently, the new code is pervaded by the ideology of human rights
and makes their protection its central concern.'48
141. Article 117 prohibits torture. See iL at 647. Crimes against freedom, honor, and dignity are descibed
in Articles 126-30. See id. at 651-54. Articles 136-49 focus on the constitutional rights of Russian citizens. See id.
at656-63. Article 138(1) allows individuals tonmaintain secret communications. See id. Articles 141-42protectfree
elections. See id. at 659. Article 144(1) prohibits officials from compelling or refusing to allow professional
journaliststodisseminateinfomation. See iL at 660-61. Article 149 additionally forbids government officials from
Interfering in otherwise legal demonstrations. See U at 662.
142. See generally id. at 666-94 (defining economic crimes).
143. Crimes against public security are defined in Articles 205-27. See id. at 694-729. The organization of
"mass disorders" is prohibited by Article 212. See i&. at 698. Flagrant violations of public order "expressed by a
clear disrespect for society accompanied by the application of force to citizens or by the threat of the application
thereof" are prohibited by Article 213. See IU
144. Section X has fourchapters: (1) CrimesAgainstFoundations ofConstituional System and Security of
State, Articles 275-84; (2) Crimes Against State Power, Interests of State Service in Agencies of Local Self-
Government, Articles285-93; (3) Crimes AgainstJustice, Articles 294-316; and(4) CrimesAganstAdministrative
Order, Articles 317-330. See U at 730-55. These chapters focus respectively on the protection of the post-Soviet
democracy from citizens who may act against it, the government from corrupt officials, the fair administration of
justice, and the administration of order. See id.
145. See generally Id. at 755-64 (focusing on regulation of individuals involved in military service).
146. See generally id. at 764-66.
147. Pomorski, supra note 125, at 376.
The Soviet state subordinated the rule of law to politics, which was determined by the Communist
Party. The Party was ultimately responsible forestablishing the policy and directives forthe various law
enforcement systems. Each force, in its own way, was concerned with assuring obedience to the
collective social rights and obligations of the citizenry. TIh extrajudicial powers afforded the police, in
particular state security force, enabled themeto perform their responsibilities and claim thatitwas being
accomplished within the context of tie Constitution of the USSR and the laws of the Soviet state. The
Soviets permitted violations ofa person's civil rights ... if it would achieve obedience to the collective
social rights and obligations.
MmRRt, supra note 34, at 318.
148. Pomorsid, supra note 125, at 378; see also Naumov, supra note 82, at 202 (stating that the new Code
revised the hierarchy of values, placing the person above the state). But see id. at 389 (stating that "[e]xcessive
severity, one of the outstanding characteristics of Soviet criminal law, has by no means been overcome in post-
Comiunist Russia; in fact, the situation seems to have deteriorated.').
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The Russian Code introduces "the principles of legality (article 3), equality of all
citizens (article 4), culpability (article 5), justice (article 6), and humanism (article
7)"into Russian law for the first time. 49 The Code also eliminates punishments such
as banishment and exile that the Soviets used extensively.19
Whether the effort to establish the rule of law has been successful is debatable.
The Code does not address weaknesses of the Soviet system, such as the general
definition of crime as a "socially dangerous act."15' Furthermore, the system of
government established by the 1993 Constitution does not rectify the problem faced
by the Soviets of having multiple branches of government with the ability to
promulgate law.152 Not only does the Assembly pass laws, Article 84 of the
Constitution permits the President to introduce legislation to the Duma, and Article
90 gives him the authority to unilaterally issue edicts that have the force of law."5
B. Security Agencies in Post-Soviet Russia
The Soviet government was based on the "dictates of the Communist Party," not
the rule of law.M State security Was more important to the government than
"ordinary police functions."'5 5 "The state was vested with all rights, while the people
were subservient to the obligations of the state. Under this system, police considered
themselves above the law .... ",156
The KGB was such an elite organization that regulations over its operations
were never published or even acknowledged.'" Finally, in May 1991, the
government published the "Law on the Organs of State Security in the USSR"
detailing the activities of the KGB.15 8 This was the beginning of the end for the
KGB.' 59 Scrutiny of the KGB increased after the coup in August 1991. On
December 3, 1991, as government authority shifted from the Soviet government to
the Russians, the Parliament passed "A Law Reforming the Functions of the
149. Naumov. supra note 82, at 202.
150. See TERRILL, supra note 34, at 347.
151. See k. at 346.
152. See i. at 344 (commenting thato ne ofth causes ofambguty in Sovietl aw was the numberof branches
that can enact law).
153. See, e.g., TERRUI, supra note 34. at 302; see also Constitution of the Russian Federation, In RUsSIAN
LEGMALTE 3 (WilliamE. Butler & lane E. Henderson eds. 1998) [hereinafter Constitution]; see also infra notes
271-90 and accompanying text (discussing the structure and functions of the Russian government). Regional
legislatures also pass laws that are binding only in that region. See TERRHI, supra note 34, at 344.
154. TERRLLHsupra note 34, at 306-07 (comparing ideals of the Soviet government to those of a democratic
government).
155. See FBWDBRUGGI, supra note 8, at 212.
156. TERRIU, supra note 34. at 307.
157. See id.
158. See id This law began to cut-back the previously unlimited powers of the KGB. See id
159. See id,
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KGB."16 This law disseminated KGB functions to other government agencies and
started the difficult process of adapting Soviet police systems to the needs of post-
Soviet Russia.' 6 ' This section discusses the distribution of power between a few of
Russia's security agencies.162
The Ministry of Security (MB) was the largest of the KGB successor agencies
with over 137,000 employees.'63 In the fall of 1993, President Yeltsin, upset that MB
leadership would not support him in his political struggle with the Parliament, fired
the Minister of Security and disbanded the agency.'6' Yeltsin created the Federal
Counterintelligence Service (FSK) in January 1994 to replace the MB. 16 However,
the legislation creating the agency was too ambiguous in both its description of and
limits on the agency powers.'66 In April 1995, with the passage of the "Law on
Organs of the Federal Security Service," the Federal Security Service (FSB)
replaced the FSK.'67 The FSB is the agency primarily responsible for Russian
security and counter-intelligence.e The'FSB also participates in criminal
investigations and maintains a pre-trial detention center1"9
The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) is responsible for the majority of police
functions in Russia. 70 The MVD is organized into national and local agencies to
160. See i&; see also Curtis, supra note 34, at 559. Tle demise of the KGB was seen as a sign of democracy
by many observers. See i&
161. See Curtis, supra note 34, at 559; See alSo COLEMAN, supra note I, at 386" see also TERRILL, supra note
34, at 307. Yeltsin also changed the daily functions of security agencies from monitoring the political activities of
Individual citizens to (1) supporting him against "high-level political opponents"; (2) battling domestic problems
of "ethnic separatism, terrorism, labor unrest, drug trafficking, and organized crime"; and (3) carrying out
counterintelligence against foreign interests in Russia. See Curtis, supra note 34, at 559 (highlighting President
Yeltsin's main objectives for internal security services).
162. See generally Curtis,s upm note 34, at 559-67 (describing the power distribution among those agencies
which replaced the KGB). The five agencies that replaced the KGB in Russia are: the Ministry of Security (MB),
the Main Guard Directorate (GUO), the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Federal Border Service and Border
Security, and the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information (FAPSI). See id at 559-67.
Functions of the Federal BorderService andFAPSI take them outside the substance of this Comment and will not
be discussed.
163. See id. at 560 (explaining the transition of power from the KGB to the MB). Primary functions of the
MB were military and political counterintelligence, 'ransportation security," political security in Russia,
investigation of government corruption and economic crimes, and general surveillance. See 1d.
164. See td. at 561-62 (discussing Yeltsin's increasing disappointment with MB leaders).
165. See i& at 562.
166. See IS "The original outline of theFSKs powers eliminated the criminal investigative powers of the
Ministry-of Security, retaining only powers of inquiry. But the final statute was ambiguous on this issue assigning
to the FSK the task of 'carrying out... criminological and other expert assessments and investigations:' i
167. See Kd at 563. Under this law, the FSB was granted complete investigative authority and control over
prisons and special military detachments. See id. (comparing FSB powers to those of the KGB). The law explicitly
gave the FSB power to enter homes as long as there was "sufficient reason" to believe that a crime was being
committed or individuals being pursued were in the home. See id at 564 (discussing FSB authority and limits).
168. See FELDBRUGGE, supra note 8, at 213.
169. SeeTERRILLsupranote 34, at 313. The Procuracy no longersupervises investigative functions. See id.
170. See Curtis, supra note 34, at 578. In addition to the traditional police functions of conducting criminal
investigations and generally maintaining order, the agency is responsible for firefighting, traffic control, vehicle
registration, transportation security, issuing visas and passports, and the running of most prisons and labor camps.
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facilitate operations. Within the national and localMVD agencies, militias operate
to fulfill MVD duties. 172 The militias are divided into security and criminal
divisions, with the criminal divisions further divided by types of criminal
activities." 3 Two significant divisions of the MVD are the Special Forces Police
Detdchment (OMON) and the Internal Troops. OMON deals with emergency
situations, such as hostage crises, large-scale public disturbances, and terrorist
threats.7 4 Soviet leaders also use OMON to put down rebellions in the republics.'"
Functions of the Internal Troops include protection of public order and guarding of
key state installations. 7 6 In 1996, a proposed plan to reorganize the MVD placed
added emphasis on law enforcement.' 77 Unfortunately, there were insufficient funds
to provide for the proposed addition of ninety-thousand police officers. 178
C. The Procuracy
Created by Lenin on May 28, 1922, the Procuracy was the agency primarily
responsible for the observance of the law in the USSR. 1'9 There were two categories
of Procuracy duties: general supervision of government agencies and supervision of
the administration of criminal justice18o General supervisory duties included
monitoring of other government agencies, officials, and individual citizens to ensure
strict and uniform observance of the law.'8' As supervisor of the administration of
criminal justice, the Procuracy supervised pre-trial investigations, prosecution of
criminal trials, and execution of sentences.' 82 According to the Constitution, the
Procuracy was independent, but in actuality the Party exercised complete control
See id.
171. See id. (comparing organization and function of local and national levels of the MVD).
172. See id.
173. See id at 580 (discussing the role of militias in the MVD).
174. See icL at 581. The OMON is also known as the Black Berets. See id During the 1990s, OMON units
were stationed at major transportation centers and metropolitan areas. See id
175. See id
176. See id Prior to 1996, the Internal Troops also guarded prisons and labor camps. See Id.
177. See id at 579.
178. However, the agency was able to increase its police force to several thousand by recruiting former
military personnel. See id
179. SeeBUTLERsupranote25at12;seeaSo FLDBRUGGEsupranote8, at205.07;see also Curtis, supra
note 34, at 582. Duties of the Procuracy remain the same in post-Soviet Russia. See infra note 193.
180. See FEWDRUGGE, supra note 8, at 205 (discussing the creation, function, and evolution of the
Procuracy).
The criminal justice system... is often harsh and arbitrary. Moreover, as the state's welfare is in
question in criminal cases [as opposed to civil cases], legal procedure is more frequently violated by
party officials and legal personnel. Furthermore, the political status of the defendant and his utility to
the state mare affect his treatment....
Louise Shelley, The Structure and Function of Soviet Courts, in THDIEDI NC fl V SOFSOVvmrLAW200 (F.M.
Feldbrugge ed., 1987) [hereinafter Shelley, Structure and Function of Soviet Courts].
181. See Fa.BRUGGF, supra note 8, at 205.
182. See id. at 206; see also Burrrmn supra note 25, at 352-60 (discussing the process of investigation and
trial).
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over the agency.18 Furthermore, Party members held most of the key positions in
the Procuracy.'8
Ordinary crimes such as robbery, bodily injury, vandalism, and murder
composed the majority of prosecutions.'8 5 The minority of cases, those based on
political motives," were subject to the most critical evaluations of Soviet criminal
proceedings!'" Current Party policy determined the handling of each of these
cases. 8 8 The administration of justice in political cases differed significantly from
cases involving ordinary crimes.189 The Party oversaw the administration of political
cases and frequently violated legal norms in the interest of the Party.Ir ° In these
cases corruption of socialist principles was not permitted, and legal counsel was of
little assistance. 9' Soviet leaders found violations of suspects' rights inconsequential
compared to the interest of social order served by the expedienthandling of cases."9
In the post-Soviet decade, the procuracy retained its functions of administering
"judicial oversight" and investigating crime. 93 As part of its responsibilities of
overseeing police agencies, the procuracy is expected to solve crimes by
successfully prosecuting criminals.194 The procuracy "is powerful and prestigious
and wields enormous influence over courtroom proceedings and... over courtroom
judges."'95 On average, procurators supervise fifteen to twenty investigators, each
183. See Hiroshi Oda, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Procuracy, in LAW AND THE
GORBACtHVERA 127, 132 (Donald D. Barry ed., 1988) [hereinafter Oda, The CPSUand the Procuracy]; see also
id. at note 26. Judges' caree depend on their conviction rates: "[Judges who tend to acquit frequently or tend to
give lenient sentences are not likely to obtain the recommendation of the Party at the next election." Id. at 133.
184. See fhL at 137.
185. See Taut supra note 34, at 322; see also Shelley, Structure and Function of Soviet Courts, supra
note 175, at 206. Even in these routine cases, private individuals or government officials could intervene in the
proceedings to "achieve their objectives." See ld.
The presumption of innocence has not been laid down expressis verbis in Soviet law. At one time it was
stamped as a 'worm-eaten dogma of bourgeois doctrine[.]" Although the Soviet Union ratified in 1973
the International Covenant of Human Rights, which in article 14(2) adopts the presumption of
innocence, the 1977 Constitution fails to mention it.
Gorle, supra note 26, at 263 (italics in original).
186. "Political offenses represent less than one percent of the total criminal cases but they are considered of
extreme importance because the offenders have violated the political order of the state." Shelley, Structure and
Function of Soviet Courts, supra note 180, at 211.
187. See id at 206.
188. See id
189. See id. at21l.
190. See id 'Legal norms are intentionally violated either as a result of individual or party intervention in
the legal process." Id. at 214.
191. Seead at 211-12 (defining corruption as primarily bribery of investigators and court officials).
192. See id (describing a political prosecrtion).
193. SeeCurtissupranote34, at582.Theprocuracyisresponsibleforbothprsecutionandudicia fndings.
See Id. Allegations of corruption and inefficiency have been levied against the procuracy, but proposed reforms in
1995 and 1996 were voted down. See IU
194. See Foglesong, supra note 10, at 551 (evaluating factors in violations of law by police and suggesting
that the procuracy overlooks these violations "if they contribute to the impression that the war against crime is being
waged successfully').
195. RAND. supra note 1, at 3.
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of whom is conducting about fifteen investigations.19 The Procuracy supervises
every part of a criminal proceeding, from the preliminary investigation to execution
of the judgment. 97
D. Prisons
While the procuracy supervises criminal proceedings, the MVD exercises
control over most prisons and camps. 198 Health and sanitary conditions in prisons
and camps continue to be deplorable."9 In fact, conditions worsened throughout the
1990s due to the increase in imprisoned individuals without a corresponding
increase in prison facilities. ° Prisons are old, employees are undertrained and
underpaid, and there is not enough food to go around. 2°' Prison authorities may not
be entirely to blame for the poor sanitary conditions, considering that Russia as a
whole is struggling to feed and clothe its population. 202
Treatment of prisoners by prison and camp officials is considerably better than
under the Soviet regime.? Prisoners are no longer denied mail or visitors, subjected
to physical abuse, or deprived of religious freedom.2° At Perm 35, prisoners "still
lived inside barbed-wire fences under the watchful eyes of armed soldiers in guard
towers. But prisoners' heads were no longer shaved. They wore name tags instead
of numbers. They ate meat or fish instead of watery gruel."25 Inmates may also wear
athletic clothes and shoes, use their own bedding from home, own watches, and
make purchases from prison stores2 °
IV. RUSsIAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AT WORK
This section considers the relationship between reforms and the functioning of
the criminal justice system in post-Soviet Russia. This section begins with an
evaluation of issues relating to pre-trial arrest and detention, including the right to
196. See Foglesong, supra note 10, at 552.
197. See infra notes 209-24,234,250 (discussing the procuraey's role in criminal proceedings).
198. See Curtis, supra note 34, at 589.
199. See id, Thisstatementrefersto healthandsanitaryconditions, notto thetreatment fprisonersbyprison
personnel.
200. See id. "With AIDS and tuberculosis raging among prison populations, (even a short sentence] may
actually be more like a life (or death) sentence:' Christopher Lehmann, Defending Sergei: Today's Post-Sovet
Ukrainian CriminalJustice System, 14 FALL CRIM. JUSr. 12,31 (1999).
201. See TWEI, supra note 34, at 370.
202. See IL at 370 (crediting the government for being silicere in its desire to improve prison conditions).
203. See Curtis, supra note 34, at 590.
204. See id.;seealso COLEMANmsupranote 1,at 185-86(consideringreformsatPerm 10andPerm35 asseen
by the author during a visit in 1992).
205. COLEMAN, supra note 1, at 185. However, contrary to statements by prison officials, one prisoner held
atPermo reported that "p]risoners arestill sent topurdshmentcells where theyarebeaten, tortured, and sometimes
killed." See ad at 185-86.
206. See TERRIL. supra note 34, at 371.
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counsel during this time?' Next, it examines the components of the trial process,
including the roles of the defendant and defense counsel, prosecutor, victim, judge,
and jury.m
A. Arrest, Detention, and Pre-Triai Right to Counsel
As part of its duties to administer justice, the procuracy supervises the
investigation of crimes and issues arrest decrees, but the police and the courts also
have the authority to issue a decree initiating a criminal investigation.m Issuance of
the decree initiates the preliminary investigation.210 Investigations are supposed to
be completed within two months, but extensions can be granted."'
Contrary to the law, suspects often remain in custody for lengthy periods of time
while the procuracy investigates the charges. - 2 The overcrowding and unsanitary
conditions in pre-trial detention facilities are inhuman?"3 Thousands of detainees die
awaiting trial.2t4 "Pretrial detention conditions can be seen as torture, continuous
207. See infra notes 209-24 and accompanying text (discussing pre-trial investigation and right to counsel).
208. See infra notes 225-61 and accompanying text (examining trial procedures).
209. See TERRillsupra note 34,at349;seealso FELDBRUGGFsupranote8, at 206; seealsoMorshchakova,
supra note 10, at 747; see also supra notes 179-97 and accompanying text (considering the general role of the
procuracy in the Russian criminal justice system). However, the procuracy has the power to vacate a decision by
the police. See ITMULL, supra note 34, at 349.
210. See ERMiLu, supra note 34, at 349 (explaining that either the police or procuracy can conduct the
investigation, but the procuracy is responsible for oversight).
211. See id. at 350.
212. See Lehnann, supra note 200, at 14-16 (considering the pre-trial process); see also Scott P. Boylan,
Coffee from a Samovar: The Role of the Vctim In the Criminal Procedure of Russia and the Proposed Vlctims
RightsAmendment to the United States Constitudon,4 U.C.DAVS.INr'LL. &POL'Y 103,114(1998) therinafter
Boylan, Coffee from Samovar] (commenting that the use of bail is rare); see also Boylan, Judicial Reform, supra
note26, at 1342-43 (stating that detainees can be held formonths oryears while theircase is investigated); see also
Foglesong, supra note 10, at 554-55 (discussing agency discretion on issues ofpre-trial detention). Two factors
strongly encourage a high rate of detention in Russia:
rTlhe institutional politics offighting crime and the legal regimeof arrest and detention.There are great
incentives for the police to arrest and detain suspects and defendants and few obstacles to doing so. Put
simply, the law of criminal procedure in Russia erects few obstacles to the arrest and detention of
citizens and the state places a high priority on expunging crime, especially through preventative
measures.
Id. at 549-50. However, the percentage of criminal suspects held during investigation decreased sharply after the
initiation of perestrolka. See RAND, supra note 1, at 31 (stating that in the late 1980s, less than one-third of all
criminal defendants were held during the pre-trial proceedings).
213. See Boylan, Judicial Reform, supra note 26, at 1342; see also id. at 1343 (arguing for development of
bail and plea-bargaining systems); see also Boylan, Coffeefrom Samovar, supra note 212, at 114 (commenting on
the "deplorable conditions" of pre-trial detention). The absence of effective plea-bargaining or bail systems
contribute to this problem. See supra note 212 and accompanying text (discussing the length of time detainees are
held and the rare use of ball).
214. See Boylan, Judicial Reform, supra note 26, at 1342.
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torture. Cells are overcrowded three times: people are compelled to sleep in turn, in
three shifts-they spend months, years in a tram-like closeness ....
Upon arrest, individuals have the right to an attorney.216 This is a significant
change from the Soviet period when attorneys had no right to be present for
interrogations or line ups. 17 In fact, defendants had no right to an attorney until the
police completed the investigation, no matter how long it took.218 In most cases,
criminal defendants did not receive the assistance of counsel until after the
preliminary hearing.219 During perestroika, laws were passed giving suspects the
right to counsel at the time of their arrest.' The extent to which defense counsel
could conduct an investigation also expanded during perestroikaO '1 These changes
were made to strengthen the attorney's ability to protect the interests of the client
and put the defendant on more equal footing with the prosecutor.22-
Upon completion of the preliminary investigation, a procurator reviews the
investigator's recommendation and determines whether to indict the suspect or
terminate the case.m Assuming the decision is to indict, the case is then assigned to
a particular court for trial.
B. Trial Procedures
This section evaluates trial procedures. The various roles of the defendant,
defense counsel, prosecutor, victim, judge, and jury are accordingly discussed.
A preliminary hearing is held in which the judge reviews the entire investigation
file and determines whether to dismiss the charges, proceed to trial, or return the
case for additional investigation.22 At the preliminary hearing, the defendant is
informed of the right not to testify or make self-incriminating statements during
trialY4 Unfortunately, these rights seem to be superficial. The right to remain silent
215. MoscowCeNTRORPRISONaM, HUMAN R GHTSVIOLATIONSINTHECRMINALJUSTCn SYSEM
oFRussiA:ARR sT, IVESTGATION,PRERJALDEENION I (Valery Abramkined., 1994) [hereinaflerAbramkin].
216. See Curtis, supra note 34, at 586.
217. See RAND, supra note , at 33.
218. See d.
219. See TERouL supra note 34, at 337 (explaining that suspects were not told they had a right to legal
counsel or were discouraged from taking advantage of the right). Even after counsel was selected, investigators
often prevented actual access until trial. See id.
220. See i
221. See id (remarking on the limitations on defense counsel to investigate under the Soviets).
222. See id at 338 (considering reforms pertaining to defense counsel).
223. See i at 350.
224. See id
225. See Thaman, Jury Systems, supra note 124, at 241.
226. See id at 246. The preliminary hearing is used to implement the constitutional prohibition of use
evidence acquired in violation of the Constitution or the Code of Criminal Procedure. See id Examples of these
violations include defense admissions and confessions gained through violations of the right to counsel or failure
to advise the suspect of the right to remain silent. See id. at 241-42. Russia also has a fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine, which acts to suppress evidence that was improperly seized. See id. at 242.
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is rarely invoked to the extent that invocation would "probably raise suspicions all
around."'' 7
Criminal defendants now have the right to choose their own attorney
28
However, the challenge of finding an attorney to take the case may prove
insurmountable because the Soviet system of state-run defense offices collapsed
along with the USSR.2 Even if an attorney is retained, preparation for trial is
difficult. Two factors complicate trial preparation for a defendant and his or her
attorney. First, counsel is frequently not retained until late in the pre-trial process ?30
Second, although defense counsel has the right to review the defendant's file, the
review must take place at the courthouse and copying of information is limited to
what the attorney can write down.21
Circumstances during trial also complicate the work of defense counsel. First,
the defendant is kept separate from the rest of the trial participants, including
defense counsel.32 Second, there is no accurate record of trial proceedings for use
on appeal.23 Trial begins with the prosecutor's presentation of evidence. The
procurator presents the government's evidence first; then the victims, also known
as private prosecutors may put on their case. Victims may present evidence of
their own or cross-examine evidence presented by the public prosecutor or the
defendant.2 s One problem with having victims involved in trials in this manner is
that it may "negatel] the presumption of innocence" because the victim's
representative can present evidence that would not be admissible by the public
227. See Lehmann, supra note 200, at 18. In all but one of the first 114jury trials, the defendant waived the
right to silence. See Thaman, Jury Systems, supra note 124, at 246. Some judges permitted the defendant to hear
the prosecutor's case before deciding whether to testify. See id.
228. See Morshchakova, supra note 10, at 748.
229. See Lehmann, supra note 200, at 14 (comparing the Soviet and modem systems of providing defense
counsel); see also Foglesong, supra note 10, at 557-59 (discussing the controversy over the expansion of the right
to counsel and the lack of funding for a state-run program).
230. See RAND, supra note 1, at 32 (explaining that under the Soviet system "[e]leventh hour consultations
were standard operating procedure. It wasn't that clients were lazy; it was hard to be lazy when you faced five to
twelve years in a labor colony. Procrastination had its roots elsewhere: in the collective socialist psyche, which
regarded defense lawyers with profound distrust.").
231. SeeLehmann, supranote200, at 16. Ingeneralaccess to technologythaicouldaidin trialpreparation,
such as computers, is limited. See RAND, supra note 1, at 27.
232. SeeBoylan, CoffeefrmaSamovarsupranote212,at 113.Theonlywayforthedefendantand defense
counsel to-confer during the trial is to whisperthrough the bars ofthe defendant's cage. See DeV'lte, supranote 82,
at 73-74. In some cases they cannot communicate at all because of the distance between the defendant and defense
counsel. See RAND, supra note 1, at 42.
233. See RAND, supra note 1, at 41-42. A court secretary takes notes during the trial. See Ud However, the
secretary's notes must be taken in longhand and the record often completely passes over parts of the trial. See id.
234. See 'Thaman, Jury Systems. supra note 124, at 246.
235. See, e.g., Ud at 243; see also DeVille, supra note 82, at 73; Boylan, Coffee from Samovar, supra note
212, at 114-15; see also RAND, supra note 1, at 73.
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prosecutor" 6 Furthermore, the public prosecutor cannot dismiss charges against a
defendant unless the victim agrees?.
7
Judges are also an integral part of trials. Russian judges play an active role in
the questioning of witnesses.238 Judges receive a complete file on the case, known
as a summary of accusations, before trial begins so that they may be completely
familiar with the facts of the case.239 The summary is prepared by the investigator
and presents the "officially sanctioned version" of the facts underlying the
prosecution and details the prosecution's case?' The judge also has the discretion
to remand the case for further investigation, upon motion of a party, if he or she
feels the file does not contain sufficient evidence for a trial."4t Legislative reforms
regarding the role of the judge reduce the inquisitorial image of Russian courts. The
judge no longer does most of the questioning of witnesses during trials. 42 Nor can
he prosecute the case if the prosecutor fails to appear for trial?43 However, sole
responsibility for sentencing lies with the judge.244
Juries were part of the trial process in Imperial Russia, but were abolished in
1917 following the Revolution.25 Article 123 of the 1993 Constitution allows for
the right to a jury trial, but requires that the Assembly pass implementing
236. Boylan, Coffee From Samovar. supra note 212, at 115. Victims and their families are often not able to
remain calm like the attorneys, and they are not expected to. This makes the questioning of witnesses, particularly
the defendant, very emotional. See RAND, supra note 1, at 73 (recounting the story of a trial witnessed by the
author). Often times the victim causes disturbances during the course of the trial with "unpredictable outbursts of
emotion, blurting out inadmissible or suppressed evidence, and necessitating laborious explanations by the judge
about every aspect of the proceeding." See Thanan, Jury Systems, supra note 124, at 243-44. Victims in criminal
trials derive theirrights from alawpromulgated under Khrushchev, shortly afterStalin's death. See Boylan, Coffee
from Samovar, supra note 212, at 105.
237. See Thaman, Jury Systems. supra note 124, at 243.
238. See Boylan, Coffeefrom Samovar, supra note 212, at 111. The judge's role has changed somewhat in
the new jury trials: "[t]he judge no longer reads the accusatory pleading nor dominates the questioning of the
defendant and the witnesses in the new jury trials. The judge may no longer prevent the prosecutor's abandonment
of the case, act as a prosecutor by necessity when the prosecutor does not appear for trial, nor return the case to the
investigator on his or her own motion." See Thaman, Jury Systems, supra note 124, at 243.
-239. See Boylan, Coffeefrom Samovar, supra note 212, at 110-11.
240. See U; see also RAND, supra note 1, at 5.
241. See Thaman, Jury Systems, supra note 124, at 241; see also supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text
(discussing preliminary hearings).
242. See Thaman, Jury Systems, supra note 124, at 243.
243. See id. The judge's ability to refer the case for further investigation on his own motion has also been
eliminated. See id. But see DeVille, supra note 82, at 106 (stating that "[ajpproximately sixty percent of the time
prosecutors do not even show up for bench or lay assessor trials, and thejudge performs the prosecutorial function.
If the prosecution has done a poor job of preparing its case, the court usually sends the case back for 'further
investigation,' thereby giving the prosecution two (or more) bites at the apple:').
244. See Lehmann, supra note 200, at 31.
245. SeeBoylan, Coffeefrom Samovarsupranote2 2, at 112.Jurieswere firstintroducedinto Russian law
by Czar Alexander 11 in 1864. See d.; see also DeVille supra note 82, at 75-78 (considering the replacement of
juries following the Revolution with people's courts and the functioning of the people's courts); see also Ud.
(discussing the history ofjuries from 1857 to 1989).Thejury system was institutedin 1995 on an experimental basis
for the first time since it was outlawed in 1918. See Curtis, supra note 34, at 587 (relating the return ofjuries to
courtrooms).
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legislation? 6 The Assembly has since permitted the use of jury trials in only nine
regions of the Russian Federation.2 7 Legislation still further limits the right to ajury
trial in cases "where imprisonment exceeds ten years or where execution is
possible. 248 Any citizen over the age of twenty-five who lives in the district where
the trial is to take place and does not have a criminal record is eligible to serve on
ajury.249 The procurator and defense counsel select twelve jurors from a randomly-
selected list of thirty to forty prospective jurors5o Jurors may participate in the
questioning of witnesses by submitting written questions to the judge who then
addresses the witnesses.5 1 Juries are also permitted free access to the preliminary
investigation file.52 At the conclusion of the trial, thejury is given a list of questions
to answer that will determine guilt or innocence53 Deliberations are completely
confidential, but the jury may ask for the assistance of the court secretary in
preparing the verdict.5 Although juries are instructed to reach a unanimous verdict,
if they have not done so in three hours, a simple majority is permitted. 55
Despite reform efforts, access to counsel is impaired,2' judges receive
prejudiced files,5 the use of juries is inconsistent,2 8 and prosecutors can appeal
246. See Constitution, supra note 153, at 43; see also Boylan, Coffeefom Samovar, supra note 212, at 112.
Rerormers began to urge the reintroduction ofjuries as early as the 1950s, but Gorbachev was the first to consider
making the change. See Stephen C. Thaman, The Resurrection of Trial by Jury in Russia, 31 STAN. 3. INT'LL. 61,
68 (1995) [hereinafter Thaman, Resurrection]; see also id. at 66-72 (commenting on Soviet legal reforms).
247. See Boylan, Coffee from Samovar, supra note 212, at 113; see also DeVille, supra note 82, at 79.
"Implementing legislation to expand the system to twelve additional regions has been stalled in the RussianDuma."
Boylan, Judicial Reform, supra note 26, at 1338. Furthermore, "a large portion of defendants waive their right to
ajury trial, in favor of being tried by the traditional court oflay assessors orby a three-judge panel." Thaman,Jury
Systems, supra note 124, at239; see also id, at 257 (evaluating the statistics relating to use ofjuries and acquittal
rates). Butsee DeVillesupra note 82, at 103 (stating that the "prospects are not good for the expansion ofjury trials
in Russia" and criticizing the proposed Code of Criminal Procedure as "taking a restrictive view ofjury trials and
placing a priority on bench trials").
248. DeVillesupranote82 at7R-79."In practice, howeverjury trials arereservedalmostentirely forcapital
cases." Id at 79.
249. See TEuMLL, supra note 34, at 339.
250. See id.
251. SeeThamanResurrection,supra note 246, at 106 (considering activequestioning ofwitnesses byjurors
and limits on jurors' questions).
252. See Tnaman, Jury Systems, supra note 124, at 247. The use of defense or witness statements contained
in the preliminary investigation file is also unlimited. See Id.
253. See Ud. at 249-51 (looking at the role of thejury in determining guilt). There are three basic questions
that must be answered: "(1) whether the corpus delicti of the crime has been proven; (2) whether the defendant's
Identity as a perpetrator of the crime has been proved; and (3) whetherhe or she is guilty of having committed the
crime." Id. at 250.
254. See Id. at 253-55 (discussing the deliberation process and comparing jury verdicts to those of a mixed
court).
255. See DeVille, supra note 82 at 81.
256. See supra notes 229-33 and accompanying text (commenting on limits placed on defense counsel).
257. See supra notes 239-40 and accompanying text (explaining the summary of accusations).
258. See supra notes 246-48 and accompanying text (evaluating the reappearance ofjuries into the Russian
criminal justice system).
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acquittals.259 Therefore, defendants in criminal proceedings are still seriously
disadvantaged.? The transition from the Soviet system is incomplete and
"opposition to judicial reform still exists and will continue as long as the legislature
is controlled by Communists, former Communists, and re-labeled Communists."' t
V. POLITICS AT THE DAWN OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
On December 19, 1999, the first Assembly of the twenty-first century was
elected.6 2 Two weeks later, on December 31, six months before the scheduled
presidential elections, President Yeltsin unexpectedly resigned.2P 6 Russia entered the
twenty-first century with Acting-President Vladimir Putin?64 According to Article
92(2) of the Constitution, elections to replace the President must be held within
three months of the vacancy.2 On March 26, 2000, the Russian people chose Putin
to be the country's second democratically-elected PresidentY'm He was inaugurated
on May 7, 2000.267 This section first outlines the basic structure of the Russian
government before focusing on Putin's agenda and his relationship with the
Assembly.20 Finally, this section considers the effect of the new administration on
criminal justice and the possible implications for the twenty-first century.270
259. See Thaman, Jury Systems, supra note 124, at 248; see also Boylan, J.dicialReform, supra note 26, at
1340-41.
260. See Boylan, Judicial Reform, supra note 26, at 1328. "TMhe outcome in a criminal proceeding may
depend asmuchonwell-placedbnbesorpayoffs as on the particularfacts and circumstances ofthecase." Lehmann,
supra note 200, at 13; see id. at 18 (criticizing ex parte contacts between thejudge and the prosecutor).
261. SeeBoylan, Judicial Refonnsupranote26, at 1343;seealso Id. at 1332(commentingthat"bureaucrats,
includingjudges, occupied their same or similar positions when the Soviet Union was intact and the Communist
Party reigned supreme."). Russia's system "remains virtually unchanged from that of the Soviet Union:' See
Lehmann, supra note 200, at 13; see also infra notes 271-90 and accompanying text (considering the current
composition of the Russian Federal Assembly).
262. See Elections in Russia (last modified Mar. 27, 2000) <httpll/www.agora.stm.ittlections/election
russia.htm> (on file with The Transnational Lawyer) [hereinafter Elections].
263. SeeAnne-MarieO'Neilletal.,heGreat Unknown, PEOPLFFeb. 28,20Dat 125 [hereinafter 'Nell];
see also David Hoffman, Putin Spills a Few Beans About Spy Days, Mo WASHINOMN POST (Mar. 10, 2000)
<htup'lwashingtonposLconlwp-dynworldexussrlA52624-2000MarchlO.html> (on file with The Transnatlonal
Lawyer).
264. See Hoffman, supra note 263.
265. Constitution, supra notel53, at 31.
266. See Russia's Putin Soothes Fears Over Regional Plans. RUSSIA TODAY (May 31, 2000) <http://www.
russiatoday.com/news.php3?id=164559&section=default> (on file with The Transnational Lawyer) [hereinafter
Putin Soothes Fears].
267. See i.
268. Seeinfranotes 271-90andaccompanyingtext(reviewingthestructureandpowerdivision oftheRussian
government).
269. See infra notes 291-339 and accompanying text (examining Putins political goals and considering his
relationship with the Assembly).
270. See infra notes 340-61 and accompanying text (postulating that the outlook for reform is good).
350
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 13
A. Political Structure and Environment
The current organization of the government and the power divisions, within the
Assembly and between the Assembly and the President, date back to President
Yeltsin's dissolution of the prior Parliament in 1993. The Constitution describes the
Powers of the Assembly."7 The Assembly is made up of the Federation Council
(Council) and the State Duma (Duma). 27
The Council has 178 deputies. Two deputies are elected from each of Russia's
eighty-nine regions?7 3 The Council has the power to approve the President's
introduction of martial law or state of emergency, schedule presidential elections,
impeach the President, and approve or dismiss the General Procurator.274 Certain
types of legislation require the Council's approval, such as budget-related laws.Vs
The Council also has the option to vote on any law passed by the DumaY 6 When the
Council rejects a law passed by the Duma, one of two things can happen: either the
Duma can override the Council with a two-thirds majority or the legislation goes to
a conciliation committee?7'
Besides approving the Prime Minister and head of the central bank, the Duma
is responsible for making lawsY8 Except as otherwise required by the Constitution,
laws are passed by a majority and then sent to the Council for action! 9 If the
Council does not act within two weeks, the Duma's legislation becomes law.8°
There are 450 deputies in the Duma elected to four-year terms. 1 Duma
members are elected by a complex process that requires voters to fill out two
ballots.8 This is because half of the Duma seats are proportionately allocated to
271. See Constitution, supra note 153 at 32-38. Election of the President and his authority are also outlined
in the Constitution. Seek!. at 27-38.
272. See About the Russian Government, RUSSIA TODAY (visited June 11, 2000) <http://www.Tussia
today.comIgovem.php3> (on file with The TransnationalLawyer) [hereinafter Government]; see also Constitution,
supra note 153, at 32-38.
273. See id. Between 1993 and 2000, these individuals were the regional executive and the head ofthe local
legislature. Legislation passed in the summer of 2000 changes the manner in which Council members are elected.
See infra notes 3 19-33 and accompanying text (discussing Putin's restructuring of the government).




278. See Elections, supra note 262.
279. See U!
280. See i.
281. See PaulAnderson,Analysis: How Russia's Elections WorkBBCNEWs (Dec. 18,1999) <http.//news.
bbe.co.uk/hi/englslworld/europelnewsid-571000/571160.stm> (on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
282. See id.
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political parties that receive more than five percent of the vote.283 Individual winners
for each of Russia's 225 legislative districts get the other half of the seats.2
Currently, twelve different parties hold seats in the Duma.m The Communist
party, with 24.3 percent, holds more seats than any other single party.286 However,
for the first time, the combined influence of pro-government parties is greater than
that of the Communist party. The Communist party may now find it more difficult
to effectively block legislation. 8 There is some concern, though, that pro-
government parties won too easily. Segodnya, a Russian newspaper, reported that
"ihe effective hyping of Vladimir Putin and... [u]nity on the basis of the Chechen
war alone, about which voters really knew nothing turned the situation around," and
that "given such efficiency in using administrative and information resources,
anyone at all could become president."289 The implication in this statement is that
the Russian people are too pliable, and with the right resources, anyone could
convince the public to follow a particular position.m
B. President Putin: The Man and His Goals
Now that he is President, Putin faces four main challenges: rebuilding the
economy, protecting Russian sovereignty, advancing the rule of law, and improving
the overall quality of life of the citizenry.291 After presenting a brief biography on
283. See Stephen Mulvey, Analysis: Russia's New Balance of Power, BBC NEWS (Dec. 21, 1999)
<http://news.bbc.co.ukhienglislworld/europenewsid_5730001573852.stm> (on file with The Transnatlonal
Lawyer) [hereinafter Mulvey, Balance of Power]; see also Anderson, supra note 278.
284. See Mulvey, Balance of Power, supra note 283. These individuals can be, and often are, without any
particular party affiliation. See k.
285. See Elections, supra note 262; see also Mulvey, Balance of Power, supra note 283.
286. See Electionssupra not262.However,thenumberofseatsheldbyCommunists declined by about five
percent. See Mulvey, Balance of Power, supra note 283. For a list of other political parties and the distribution of
Duma seats, see Elections, supra note 262.
287. See Mulvey, Balance of Power, supra note 283. The primary opposition to the Communist Party comes
from the Unity and Union of Right-Wing Parties. See l&; see also Russian Press Reflects on Election Shock, BBC
NEws (Dec. 21, 1999) <http:/Jnews.bbc.co.uklhienglishlworldia-eportslnewsid-573000/573240.stm> (on file
with The Transnadional Lawyer) [hereinafter Russian Press Reflects on Election Shock] (remarking on a number
of newspaper headlines following Assembly elections). For a brief outline of the creation of the Unity Party, see
Sudden Rise of the Unity Party, BBC NEws (Dec. 20, 1999) <lhttpJ/Inews.bb.couk/hitenglish/world/
europetnewsid-572000I572646.stm> (on file with The TransnationaLawyer) [hereinafterSuddenRise ofthe Unity
Party].
288. See Sudden Rise of the Unity Party, supra note 287 (commenting on the ability of the Communists in
the prior regime to '"nobilize [sic] their allies in other parties to block govenment legislation"); see also Russian
PressReflects on Election Shock, supra note 287 (quoting the Russian paper Komsomolskaya Pravda as saying the
election was "an unequivocal defeat" for the Communists and that communist ideology has "no.appeal to the new
generation").
289. Russian Press Reflects on Election Shock, supra note 287.
290. See id.
291. See Kara Murphy, Putin and Russia: Two Scenarios, RUSSIA TODAY (Jan. 21, 2000)
<httpdlwww.russiatoday.comfeatures.php3?id=127666> (on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (commenting
on "the dramatic andterrifyingdisintegration" of Russia. "Since 1992,theonce-powerful Sovietstatehas given way
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Putin,"2 this section considers how he has begun to address these issues in his short
time in office, how he is likely to proceed,e 3 and the significance of his actions on
the criminal justice system.294
1. His Rise to Power
Putin graduated in 1975 with a civil law degree?9 5 He then spent more than
fifteen years in the KGB.2 Putin said he knew the Communist system, and the
USSR itself had no future, even while he was still in the KGB?97 He once tried to
resign from the agency but his "first notice of resiguation got lost somewhere."
' ' 8
After the August 1991 coup, Putin left the KGB to pursue politics."
In 1996, after a brief introduction to politics, he began his rise in the FSB. °°
Three years later, he returned to politics? 0' On August 16, 1999, after announcing
that "law and order" were his top priorities, the Duma confirmed Vladimir Putin as
Russia's fifth Prime Minister in less than a year and a half.°2
Putin's primary campaign promise was that he would fight corruption and the
rich and powerful oligarches who exercised considerable influence over Yeltsin
to a withered Russian replacement. Government officials have little capacity to administer state affairs, and the
public looks upon its leaders with suspicion and hostility. Russians are suffering economically, physically,
emotionally, and spiritually." Id. On May 7,2000, Putin took an oath to "safeguard human rights, defend Russian
independence, and faithfully serve the people." Putin Aims to Unite Russia, BBC NEws (May 7, 2000)
<http.J/news.bbc.co.uk/lienglisblworldeuropetnewsid_739000739974.stm> (on file with The Transnational
Lawyer) [hereinafterPutinAlns]. During his inaugural address, Putin announcedthat he views unity of theRussian
people "around common tasks" as his "sacred duty." See i He added that: "We want our Russia to be a free,
prosperous, rich, strong and civilised [sic] country, a country ofwhich its citizens are proud and which is respected
in the world." L
292. See infra notes 295-306 and accompanying text (reviewing Putin's career in security agencies and
politics).
293. See infra notes 307.39 and accompanying text (considering Putin's political agenda and actions he has
taken with respect to Chechnya and political restructuring).
294. See infranotes340-61 and accompanying text (maintaining thatcontinuedreform isnecessary andPutin
is likely to succeed at instituting such reform).
295. See O'Neill, supra note 263, at 126.
296. See id; Who is VadirPutin?, CNN (visited Mar. 18, 2000) <http:lwww.cnn.comSPECIALS/2000/
russlatstorylanalysis/putin21> (on file with The Transnauional Lawyer).
297. See Hoffman, supra note 263.
298. See id. (quoting Patin).
299. See O'Neill, supra note 263. at 126 (mentioning Patin's short time as a deputy mayor).
300. See id.; see also Hoffman, supra note 263.
301. See infra notes 302-05 and accompanying text (describing Putin's reentry into politics).
302. See Russian Duma Confirms Putln as Prime Minister, CNN (visited Aug. 16,1999) <http.//www.cnn.
com?WORLDleurope/99081161russia.putin.031> (on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
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through the creation of "a dictatorship of the law."303 Other than that, he refused to
reveal many details about his plans for his presidency?"
Putin is widely supported and even heralded as Russia's savior.30s Despite his
popularity, human rights activists argue that Putin "is a dangerous authoritarian,
handpicked by a cabal of Kremlin insiders, and levered into power by a breathtaking
ruthless plot."3°6
2. Political Goals and Relations with the Federal Assembly
Although the economy is one of Putin's major concerns, this Comment
overlooks the minutia of his economic policies in favor of the larger picture of what
he is doing to address issues of sovereignty and the rule of law.3 7 Because political
reforms are vital to the long-term success of economic reform, Putin's main focus
thus far has been restructuring the political system and cementing Russian
authority.- 8 By waging war on Chechnya, Putin has shown that Russian sovereignty
is one of his top priorities. 9 The war in Chechnya illustrates the extent to which
303. See Andrew Harding, Why is Putin Popular?, BBC News (Mar. 8, 2000) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/hli/
english/worldeurope/newssi_.669000/6692f47.stm> (on file with The Transnational Lawyer); see also Stephen
Mulvey, Putin: TheSpy Who Came into theKremlin, BBCNEws (Mar. 9,2000) <http//Inews.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/
worldeuropelnewsid-667000667749.stm> (on file with The Transnational Lawyer) [hereinafter Mulvey, Putin];
see also Henry Meyer, Putin, The New "Tsar" of Russia, Ends Tumultuous Yeltsin Era, RUSSIA TODAY (Mar. 27,
2000) <http'//www.russiatoday.comlfeatures.php3?id=14609> (on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
304. See Hoffman, supra note 263; see also Harding, supra note 303. He did, however, say that he would
"combat social injustice... and use state intervention to promote domestic industry." See Meyer, supra note 303.
305. See Harding, supra note 303; see also Mulvey, Patin, supra note 303.
306. See Harding, supra note 303; see also Mulvey, Putin, supra note 303.
307. See Despite Vctory, Putin Has A Mountain To Climb, RuSSIA TODAY (Mar. 27, 2000) <http:/Iwww.
russiatoday.com/featums.php3?id=146082> (on file with The Transnational Lawyer) [bereinafterDespite Wctory]
(remarking on Putin's vow to tackle poverty); see also Murphy, supra note 288 (arguing that Putin will be able to
effectuate macroeconomic policies and that stability in the economy will help him ensure reelection); see also
Stephen Mulvey, Analysis: Challenges ahead for Puth, BBC NEWs (Mar. 27, 2000) <http'/news.bbc.co.uk/
hilengishlworldeuropenewsiL692000692245.sm> (on file withTheTransnatonaLawyer) [hereinafterMulvey,
Challenges Ahead] (commenting on Putin's statements regarding economic reforms). This section will touch on
economics as it relates to issues that are discussed, but does not attempt to explain or solve Russian economic
problems.
308. See Despite Wctaorysupra note 307 (commenting on Russia's state f political chaos); see also Mulvey,
ChallengesAhead, supra note 307 (mentioning Putin's plans to fight corruption and crime); see also Patin in His
Own Words, BBC NEws (Mar. 27, 2000) <http:lnews.bbe.co.ukfliienglishlwo.rldliareportlnewsid_667
0001667634.stm> (on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (quoting Putin as saying that "(w]hile corruption goes
unchecked 'there cannot be any kind of positive development in the country.'").
309. See infra notes 313-24 and accompanying text (recounting the history ofconflict between Chechnya and
Russia);seealsoMurphy, supra note 291 (hypothesizing that continuing the warin Chechnya will increase national
pride). Another indication that Putin considers sovereignty a priority is the division of Russia into seven districts,
each to be run by a Putin nominee. See Putin Soothes Fears, supra note 266 (explaining Putin's plans to "shor[c]
up the rule of law in the vast nation").
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Putin will go to protect Russian sovereignty 10 Thus, this section considers the war
and its implications, particularly what it says about Putin's character as it pertains
to the Russian criminal justice system M It then evaluates the legislative measures
Putin instituted immediately upon taking office to further his campaign for the
creation of a "dictatorship of the law.""
a. Chechnya
Chechnya was first invaded by Russia in 1783. Throughout the Soviet period,
the region was treated as an enemy territory within the USSR. 14 In 1944, Stalin
deported more than 600,000 people to central Asia for allegedly collaborating with
the Germans during World War II315 Those who survived the exile were permitted
to return home in 1957, where they found Russians occupying their homes 3 6
Chechnya declared independence from the USSR in 1990 and chose not to sign
the later federation treaty 17 Russia's refusal to accept Chechnya's desire to remain
independent led to bitter battles between Russian troops and Chechen "rebels."38
310. See Meyer, supra note 303 (quoting Putin as saying, "Russia needs a strong state power"); see also
Mulvey, Challenges Ahead, supra note 307 (indicating that the situation in Chechnya is being used to generate
respect for Russian authority).
311. See nfranotes356-61 andaccompanying text (considering theprospects forthedevelopment oftherule
of law under Putin's guidance).
312. Seesupranote303andaccompanyingtext(discussingPtinsprmisetcratea"ditatorshipofaw");
see also tnfra notes 325-39 and accompanying text (commenting on restructuring of the Federation Council); see
also Putin Expected To Win Fight With Governors, RUSSIA TODAY (June 9, 2000) <http://www.russiatoday.
comlnews.php3 id=167425&section=defaut>(onf ewithTheTransuatlonalLawyer)herenafterPutlnEpected
To Win] (suggesting a relationship between the issues of sovereignty and rule of law).
313. See Wendy lbrnoff Atrokhov, The Khasavyurt Accords: Maintaining the Rule of Law and Legitimacy
of Democracy in the Russian Federation Amidst the Chechen Crisis, 32 CORNL.L INT'LLJ. 367, 369 (1999). See
generally id. (providing a detailed description of the history of Chechnya).
314. See Ud at 371-72.
315. See iL at 371; see also Key FactsAbout Chechnya, RUSSIATODAY (OCL 12,1999) <http://www.rxssia
tody.cornJfeatures.php3?id=1000431> (on file with The Transnational Lawyer) [hereinafer Key Facts About
Chechnyal.
316. See Key FactsAbout Chechnya, supra note 315.
317. See Atrokhov, supra note 313, at 373.
318. See id. at 373-75.The entireNorthem Caucasusregion has been unstablesince the collapse oftheUSSR.
See Francoise Dehove, Trouble Spots of the Caucasus, RUSSIA TODAY (Oct. 12, 1999) <http:/lwww.russiatoday.
com/features.php3?id=100433> (on file with The Transnational Lawyer). One of the reasons Russia is so
determined to hold on to Chechnyais its location. The republic's "position is strategic in that it straddles the main
highway and the only railway and oil pipeline through Russian territory between the Caspian Sea and the Black
Sea." Key FactsAbout Chechnya, supra note 315. Anotherreason is "fear of setting aprecedent for otherrepublics
who may want to secede:' Dehove, supra. A third possible explanation is thatthoRussian governmentis attempting
to cope with the Soviet policy of "Russification," which resulted in transplantation of ethnic Russians into other
regions of the vast USSR. See iE; see also supra note 316 and accompanying text (mentioning how Russification
was effected in Chechnya). Compare Aslambek Kadev, Opinion: A Chechen View of Russia's War, BBC NEws
(Dec. 26,1999) <http://news.bbe.conuk/hienglishiworld/europenewsid-577000/57752.stm> (on file with The
Transnational Lawyer) (criticizing Russia's actions against Chechnya as political and Russian claims against
Chechens as pretextual).
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Russia granted de facto independence to the republic in 1996, following an almost
two year war 9 In the peace agreement between Russia and Chechnya, both sides
renounced the use of force in resolving further disputes and agreed to conduct their
relations according to the standards of international law2° However, this agreement
did not stop Russia from again going to war in the republic following a series of
apartment bombings throughout Russia in early 1999 by Chechen terrorists.
321
Suppressing Chechen "rebels" led Putin's agenda as Prime Minister and
continues to be the mainstay for his popularity among Russian citizens .3 2 One may
wonder what it is about Plitin's fierce attitude towards Chechnya that makes him so
popular. For many, his approach proves that he is a "strong man who will restore
order at home, and lost pride on the world stage." 32 However, not everyone supports
Putin's unrelenting attacks on Chechnya. Some people are concerned about the
impact on Russian citizens in the area, while others are worried that Putin's desire
to revive Russia's status as a world power will lead to militaristic nationalism. 3 u
b. Restructuring and The Federal Assembly's Response
Putin initiated two levels of restructing directed at developing the rule of law.
First, in an attempt to "smooth communication" between the regions and generate a
"uniform understanding of the laws at all points across the Russian Federation," Putin
signed a decree dividing Russia's eighty-nine regions into seven districts?37 Second,
he pushed legislation through the Assembly that affected the composition of the
Council and expanded his authority over regional governors.?2
319. See Dehove, supra note 318.
320. See Kadiev, supra note 318. However, Chechnya's President Maskhadov, elected in 1997, lost much
of his support and control over the last few years. See Key FactsAbout Chechnya, supra note 315. Maskhadov was
the commander ofthe republic's military during thewarandisthe official who negotiated thepeace agreementwith
Russia. See Dehove, supra note3l8.Maskhadov now controls only partofthe region, with therest underthe control
of lawless warlords. See Key FactsAbout Chechnya, supra note 315; see also Dehove, supra note 318.
321. See eg., Kadiev, supra note 318; Putin Says Negotiations With Chechen President Pointless, RUSSIA
TODAY (Aug. 31, 2000) <http.//www.russiatoday.com/chechnyainfocusinews.php3?id=194433> (on file with The
Transnational Lawyer).
322. See O'Neill, supra note 263. Putin urges that "you must hit first, and hit so hard that your opponent will
not rise to his feet." Hoffman, supra note 263.
323. Mulvey, Putin, supra note 303.
324. See i.
325. See, eg.,Putin Latest Leaderfo Rein in Regional SpendingRUSSIA ToDAY (June 2, 2000) <http://www.
russiatoday.com/news.php3?id=165428&section=default> (on file with The Transnational Lawyer) [hereinafter
Latest Leader] (explaining the division); see also Putin Soothes Fears, supra note 266 (quoting Putin's explanation
of his plan); see also Influential Russian lycoon Boris Berezovsky Attacks Putin, RUSSIA TODAY (June 1, 2000)
<http:llwww.russiatoday.comlnews.php3id?=165101&section- default> (on file with The Transnutlonal Lawyer)
[hereinafterBerezovskyAtacksPutin (discussing Putin's decree and accusations that he is "driving Russia towards
dictatorship through his plans to grab power back from the regions),
326. See Main Points of New Laws on Russian Regions, RUsSIA TODAY (June 1, 2000) <http://www.mssia
today.comInews.php3id=164953&section--default> (on file with The Transnational Lawyer) [hereinafter Main
Points] (breaking down the elements of Putin's legislative reforms); see also Russian Parliament Considers Putin's
Controversial Regional Plan, RUSSIA TODAY (June 1, 2000) <http://www.rssiatoday.con/news.php3?ld=
356
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Part of Patin's legislative package converted the Council from a part-time body
to a full-time body. 27 Regional governors and parliamentary leaders had to be
removed from their positions because their regional positions prevented them from
fully committing themselves to the Council? 8 Under the new system, instead of the
governors and parliamentary leaders filling the region's seats in the Council, these
officials will each nominate another person to fill those seats .3
Another aspect of the legislation is that it gives Putin the power to remove and
replace regional governors for certain violations of federal laws or civil rights.330 This
change revokes the broad immunity from prosecution the governors enjoyed under
Yeltsin? 3 This is important because the broad immunity in Russia contributed to the
existing corruption left behind by the Soviets. 32 In order to make any long-term
improvements on the economic and criminal justice systems, Putin must address the
broad base of government corruption? 3
Hopefully, by removing the protection of immunity from the regional governors,
Putin will be more able to protect the rule of law in the regions. Although the
legislation faced almost no opposition in the Duma, not everyone favored the
changes3 34 An influential businessman and Duma deputy, Boris Berezovsky, called
the changes a "mistake' and compared them to the Soviet system of centralizing
164949&section--default> (on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (calling Putin's plan "the biggest shake-up of
government since the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991").
327. See Main Points, supra note 326 (referring to the legislation that argued the part-time nature of the
Council made it an ineffective body).
328. Seeid
329. See d. The regional legislature will then vote by secret ballot on the confirmation of these nominees.
Seel&
330. See Id. Removal is preceded by a warning. See it Some, but not all, violations also require a hearing
before removal. See 14
331. See id. (stating that by losing their seats in the Council, governors also lose the "immunity from
prosecution that comes with those seats."). While it is wll-accepted that legislators have some degree of immunity
from prosecution, the level of that immunity varies from country to country. See generally Scott P. Boylan and
Catherine L Newcombe, Parliamentary Immunity: A Comparison Between Estabi ished Democracies and Russia
Crisis of Democratic Legitimacy for Russia, 3. 1Tr'L LGAL STUD. 205, 205-35 (1997) [hereinafter Boylan &
Newcombe] (explaining application of the privilege in several countries). Immunity for members in Russia, and
previously in the USSR, is extremely broad. See i& at 237-38 (introducing parliamentary immunity in Russia and
discussing immunity in the USSR). Current provisions for parliamentary immunity are set out in Article 98 of the
Constitution and'TheFederal Law on the Status ofDeputies of the Federal Council and on the Status of Deputies
of the State Duma," passed in May 1994. See id. at238-39. like most democracies, Russian legislators are immune
from prosecution for conduct performed in relation to their official duties. See U at 240. Further, in Russia, the
possibility exists that legislators can completely avoid prosecution for any criminal activity. See id. at 24042, 244-
47 (contemplating the extent of immunity and the complicated waiver procedures). Moreover, immunity extends
to candidates, often motivating criminals to run for a position in order to avoid prosecution. See EL at 247-48.
332. See, eg., Murphy, supra note 291.
333. See id. (wondering whether Putin is up to the challenge).
334. SeeRussian Businessman DubsPutin'sNewPlan "Soviet,"RUsSAToDAY(June2,20D0)<http:flwww.
nissiatoday.com/news.php3?id=165524&section=default> (on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (commenting
on the lack of criticism).
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government.335 Regional governors also opposed the plan: expressing outrage, they
argued that the laws "highlight the movement towards the creation of a unitary state"
in violation of "democratic norms. 336 Although Council members opposed Putin's
plan, it received strong support from most members of the Duma.337 In fact Putin,
unlike Yeltsin, enjoys broad support from the Duma.38 "The Duma has cooperated
with Putin to an unprecedented degree since his election and has shrunk from
challenging the Kremlin on any key legislation, approving radical economic reforms
that stalled in previous governments and awarding the President direct control of the
country's unruly regions. 3 39
C. Implications for the Criminal Justice System
Within hours of being elected, Putin made several statements regarding his
position on human rights.3 ° He said that the "'rights of the specific individual, not
of the crowd, should come first."341 However, he also stated that "[tihe pace of work
of the security services under the previous government should 'not only be
maintained but exceeded."'4 2 While mostRussians view Putin's past in the KGB and
FSB as a sign that he will be a strong leader who is tough on crime, others fear that
his stand against those who might speak out against the government is presently too
strong and may become oppressive.M3 Sme believe that the powers Putin secured
335. See U£ Berezovsky stated at a press conference: "I am sure that personally he is not trying to become
a dictator, but through his actions he is bringing that situation about." Berezovsky Attacks Putin, supra note 325.
336. Revolt Grows overPutin'sPlanstoShake-Up Parliament, RUSSIATODAY (June 8,2000) <http://www.
russiatoday.corninews.php3?id=167065&section-default> (on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (quoting
regional governors Leonid Roketsky and Alexei Lebed). But ifthe governors oppose restructuring because it leaves
them open to prosecution for their corrupt practices, as media reports indicate, Putin is indeed on the way to
accomplishing his goal of establishing law and eliminating corruption. See Regional ChlefsAttack Pulin Plan to
Lift Immunity, RussiA TODAY (June 8, 2000) <http.llwww.russiatoday.comlnews.php3?id=167279&section=
default> (on file with The Transnational Lawyer); see also Patin in Race to Force'Through Bills, Cement His
Authority, RUSsIATODAY (June 9, 2000) <http'//www.nssiatoday.com/news.php3?id=167481& section=default>
(on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (stating that at least ten regional governors have avoided prosecution
because of immunity protections); see also Putin Erpected To Wn, supra note 312 (saying that "some governors
were afraid of losing immunity from prosecution because they would almost immediately be arrested.").
337. See Putin Expected To lWm4supranote32(calling theDumathe morepowerfulhouseofthelegislature
and stating that "parties in the Duna have already been eyeing the possibilities that a reform of the upper house
would give them.").
338. See Duma Set To BackPatin Laws To Boost CentralRule, RUSSIATODAY (May 31, 2000) <hUp.llwww.
russiatoday.com/news.php3?id=164589&section=default> (on file with The Transnational Lawyer); see also
Despite Victory, supra note 307 (noting that Putin's relationship"gives him both economic and political breathing
space to establish something of apowerbase").
339. Russians DemandAnswersfrom Suddenly-Sluggish Putin over Kursk, RUSSIA TODAY (Aug. 22,2000)
<Jhttp'//www.russiatoday.com/news.php3?id=191465&section=defalt> (onfilewith The TransnatonalLawyer).
340. See Putin in His Own Words, supra note 308 (recounting Putin's comments on several current issues).
341. la.
342. 1L
343. SeeMulvey, ChallengesAhead,supranote 307 (reringtoPutinsattitudestowardthemediaandother
critics). Opponents suggest it will be hard for Putin to "shed the instincts drummed into him during his KGB
training:' Putin Looks Bad at Home andAbroad OverSub Deaths, RUSSIATODAY (Aug.22, 2000) </http'//www.
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for himself in the recent restructuring are signs of "his authoritarian tendencies."3 4
Others argue that these reforms are essential to the future success of economic
reforms. 5
Recently, following the tragic loss of a nuclear submarine and the 118 sailors
aboard, a French newspaper made a statement that supports these criticisms by
Russian liberals. The paper critically asserted that reactions to the loss "showed
that the mentality of the Russian leaders, military and civilian, starting with Vladimir
Putin, is still profoundly anchoredin the defects of leaden Sovietism." ''  On the other
hand, Putin's acceptance of responsibility for and expressions of guilt over the loss
show that he has "outgrown the Soviet cult of secrecy." '' Unlike his Soviet
predecessors, Putin was not so quick to allocate blame for the incident, saying an
investigation would precede any punishment.? 9
Taken separately, involvement in Chechnya,50 political restructuring,31 and
conduct surrounding the submarine crisis,352 give both supporters and opponents
grounds to argue about what kind of president Putin will be. Putin has taken afirm
stand against those he considers threats to Russian stability,3 53 but is that not what
every country expects of its leader? There is abig difference between a strong leader
and a dictator. Putin did not use violence to accomplish his restructuring plan.3 He
did not open fire on his opponents; rather, he used the established system to reform
itself.355 Putin's acceptance ofresponsibility for the submarine crisis and his approach
russiatoday.cornspecialfsubmarine-news.php3?id=191180> (on file with The Transnational Lawyer) [hereinafter
Putin Looks Bad].
344. See Latest Leader. supra note 325.
345. See id,
346. See Putin Looks Bad, supra note 343.
347. Id. (quoting Le Monde); see also Ekaterina Laina, Putin Political Fallout Seen Short-Lived, RussiA
TODAY (Aug. 28, 2000) <http://www.russiatoday.cominews.php3?id=193211&section--default> (recounting an
interview with formerchief of the Russian foreign intelligence service Yury Kobaladze, where he said the incident
was handled by Putin's inferiors in classic Soviet style when the thinking was that: "Theboss is on holiday; it's not
worthbotheringhimandweilmakedosomehow').SociologistAlexeiGrazhdankn"conededthatinthistragedy,
not only the authorities had adhered to a Soviet system of values, but the people, too." Id. He said that the people
are first concerned with their own living standard and not until Russia prospers economically will they be able to
express concern for human life. See d.
348. See Broadcast Shows Putin Emerging From Soviet Shadows, RussIA TODAY (Aug. 24, 2000)
<ittp.//www.russiatoday.com/news.php3?id=192122&section=default> (on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
Soviet leaders would never have shown such remorse for the loss of life. See id. (commenting on Politburo
indifference to human suffering).
349. See i.
350. See supra notes 313-24 and accompanying text (relating the issues surrounding the conflict with
Chechnya).
351. Seesupranotes325-39andaccomp:ningtext(explaininggovemmentrestructuringintiatedbyPutin).
352. See supra notes 346-49 and accompanying text (mentioning the media reports of a recent submarine
loss).
353. See supra notes 322,331-36 and accompanying text (examnning Putins approach to corruption through
his stand on the Chechnya issue and corruption in the government).
354. See supra notes 325-39 and accompanying text (considering the application of Putins restructuring
plan).
355. See id,
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to investigation and punishment for the incident show he will govern more fairly than
most Soviet leaders. Overall, the prospects for the development of the rule of law are
at their best ever.
In his six months in office, Putin has not specifically directed reforms at the
criminal justice system. However, his efforts toward reducing official corruption 56
and statements regarding human rights3 7 indicate that he is aware of problems within
the system. Furthermore, to stabilize the economy and improve national morale, Putin
will need to eventually address the various issues contemplated by this Comment.
Putin's positive relationship with the Duma will facilitate reforms initiated by either
the President or the Duma.?58 Between Putin's goals, 59 the changed composition of
the Duma,360 and the building blocks provided by reforms of the last decade,361 the
next few years should generate significant development in Russia.
VI. CONCLUSION
It has been said that an effective legal system cannot exist without the enactment
and publication of understandable, consistent, realistic legal rules; avoidance of
retroactive legislation; sufficient stability in the law to permit compliance; and
congruence between the laws as announced and their actual administration.362 The
law "must guarantee the rights of individuals, provide for a means of an ordered
society, and distribute the functions of government in a way that empowers the
populace. '3 63 Russia has not yet achieved these goals.
"Despite subjecting Russia to its most sweeping changes since 1917, Yeltsin
failed to push through lasting economic reforms and ultimately presided over a
deeply polarized society of the few haves and the many have-nots." 3 4 By the time
Yeltsin resigned, "Russia was still struggling to come to terms with the miserable
legacy of decades of Soviet mismanagement as shadowy bhsiness tycoons pulled the
strings of power behind the scenes" '3 The slow pace of change should not detract
from the hopefulness that in time, the transformation to a society ruled by its laws
will be complete. Reform does not suddenly happen with a change in leadership or
356. See i (considering the effects of restructuring).
357. See supra note 341 and accompanying text (quoting Putin).
358. Seesupranotes337-39 and accompanying text (commenting that Putin enjoys significant support from
the Duma).
359. See supra notes 291, 308-12 and accompanying text (mentioning Putin's goals for stabilizing the
country).
360. See supra notes 285-88 and accompanying text (discussing the reconfiguration of the Duma following
the December 1999 elections).
361. See supra notes 109-255 and accompanying text (evaluating post-Soviet reforms of the 1990s).
362. See Lien, supra note 25, at45.
363. Id. at 114.
364. Meyer supranote303."Organizeddumeflourishedinthvldofinadquatelegislationaprolifertion
of shadow economic structures and a demoralized and cash-strapped police force and army." Id.
365. Id.
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even political structure. This is especially so in Russia where the new leadership
consists of many of the same people who held positions in the USSR.36
The Russian government instituted significant reform measures in the 1990s. A
new Constitution and Criminal Code were adopted.3 ' Police functions received
greater scrutiny than they ever did under Soviet leaders3 ca Treatment of prison and
labor camp inmates became more humane 69 Investigation and trial proceedings
expanded criminal defendants' access to justice."
More still needs to be done to complete the transition from the Soviet rule of
terror to the desired rule of law. A new Code of Criminal Procedure must be adopted.
Piecemeal amendments to the Soviet Code are insufficient to reconcile the
contrasting ideals of the USSR and Russia.37' Limits on police powers, consistent
with the Constitution and Codes, need to be legislated and enforced?3 2 Particularly
because the Russian government is still standing in the Soviet shadow, President
Putin should take a leading role in humanizing police investigations.373
Reforms to the Procuracy might include separating investigative and
prosecutorial functions to ensure more independent analysis of a pending case.374
Steps should be taken to protect a suspect's pre-trial rights to counsel and review of
detention, and trial procedures need to be evaluated for ways to improve access to
counsel and an impartial court. 73
As the first year of the twenty-first century comes to a close, Russia is in a better
position than ever before to make needed changes. Ten years have passed since the
collapse of the USSR. For the first time ever, power changed hands through
democratic elections. Finally, Russiahas ayoung, energetic President who has agood
relationship with the Duma and has shown a desire to make changes.
366. See TE ,LL supra note 34, at 295 (predicting that "significant change in thejustice system wil not be
forthcoming during the early stages of the transformation" from Communism to Democracy). As products of
Communism, Russian leaders may "rely upon agents of the criminal justice system for the retention of a degree of
order.... [and] condone or encourage the use of law enforcement and order maintenance methods from the past
that proved effective." Id.
367. See supra notes 105-13, 133-50 and accompanying text (evaluating the Constitution and the Criminal
Code).
368. See supra notes 154-78 and accompanying text (commenting on reforms to security agencies).
369. See supra notes 203-06 and accompanying text (discussing improvements in treatment of prison and
labor camp inmates).
370. See supra notes 216-22,226-28,245-50 (evaluating criminal proceedings).
371. See supra notes 114-27 and accompanying text (criticizing the Code of Criminal Procedure).
372. See supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text (recounting frequent changes in the structure and
authority of security agencies).
373. See supra note 366 and accompanying text (explaining that current officials were also government
officials of the USSR).
374. See supra notes 193-97, 209-24 and accompanying text (examining the functions of the Procuracy
throughout investigation and trial).
375. See supra notes 212-15, 228-33 and accompanying text (discussing limits on access to counsel and the
ability to put together a defense, as well as the ways trials are prejudiced against the defendant).

